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The aim of this case study is to understand the 
underlying political economy dynamics of the maize 
value chain (MVC) in Nigeria, with a focus on how 
this can contribute to comprehending the drivers and 
constraints of agricultural commercialisation. The study 
is informed by theories of political settlements, rents, 
and policy processes. It asks questions around (1) the 
key actors and interests: who participates and how do 
they benefit? (2) Rules and policies: who makes the 
rules, and who wins and loses? And (3), what are the 
implications across different social groups? 
The focus on maize is motivated by the fact that it is one 
of the primary staple foods in the country. Nigeria is the 
tenth largest maize producer globally and the second 
largest producer in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Maize is 
the second most cultivated crop in Nigeria, in terms of 
area harvested (5.8 million ha), after cassava (7.1 million 
ha). It has high economic value due to its adaptability 
in the Guinea Savannah agro-ecological zone of the 
country. While an estimated 60 per cent of the maize 
produced in Nigeria is used for industrial purposes, its 
contribution to gross domestic product (GDP) is still 
low. This is partly because a considerable proportion 
is consumed locally with little value addition. The study 
was carried out during 2020 and early 2021. It is based 
on document analysis and key informant interviews 
(KIIs) with commercial maize farmers and wholesalers. 
 
Three key findings illustrate the political economy of the 
MVC in Nigeria. First and foremost, the high demand 
for maize products such as food, feed, and industrial 
raw material attracts many stakeholders’ political 
interests. These include the political elites, policy 
makers, industrial processors, and traders. Notably, the 
political elite’s interest in the MVC is mainly focused on 
the fertiliser inputs required in maize production, where 
they tend to benefit from the diversion of subsidised 
fertiliser from the government. Private sector processing 
industries and traders prefer to import maize because 
they profit from the relatively lower prices compared to 
domestically produced maize.
Second, changes in political regimes and associated 
policies present a challenge to dealers’ and farmers’ 
access to fertiliser and inputs. The government’s 
constant effort to boost and improve smallholder 
farmers’ productivity through policies intended to aid 
adoption and increase fertiliser use is yet to translate into 
an increase in sustainable agricultural production, rural 
household income, and livelihood. Most smallholder 
farmers fail to benefit from these government efforts 
and policies due to their poor implementation and 
targeting, as observed in the government’s fertiliser 
policy. Despite the government’s costly expenditure 
on fertiliser subsidies, most of the subsidised fertiliser 
falls into the hands of the private sector, who sell it at 
a higher price. At the same time, some subsidised 
fertiliser is exported through back doors to Nigeria’s 
neighbouring countries, where it is sold at higher 
prices. Hence, it is reported that only a small quantity 
of subsidised fertiliser gets into the hands of small scale 
farm holders. This has caused smallholder farmers to 
conclude that the implementation of fertiliser subsidies 
in Nigeria is ineffective and inefficient.
The import regulation of maize is also a key factor in the 
political economy dynamics of the MVC. The national 
business strategy to source maize from domestic 
suppliers, means that the Nigerian government 
imposes strict foreign exchange measures, making 
it challenging to obtain import and export permits. 
However, due to growing demand in the feed sector, 
large feed mills and poultry farms occasionally obtain 
import permits to purchase foreign maize when they 
anticipate a significant shortfall in domestic supply. 
The underlining factors that drive the restriction of 
foreign imports of maize are essentially to i) ensure 
supply is bought from domestic sources, fetching 
higher prices for smallholder farmers and, ii) curtail the 
diversion of foreign exchange by importers for other 
profitable purposes instead of investing in the MVC. 
However, politically well-connected business people 
still undertake some regional trade. The informal cross 
border trade flows of maize between Nigeria and its 
neighbouring countries are concentrated on the Kano–
Katsina–Maradi region at the border with Niger. This 
corridor is characterised by flows of both local products 
and commodities from other countries.
Third, the social differentiation between men and 
women has direct implications for the prospects 
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for commercialisation of the MVC in Nigeria. As a 
commercial or cash crop, maize’s production and sale 
for commercial purposes is dominated by men. Women 
farmers often view maize production as a productive, 
income-generating activity, yet refrain from growing 
maize because they lack the capital to purchase the 
required inputs, like fertiliser, or hire someone to plough 
the fields. Instead, they cultivate maize on a limited 
scale and continue growing other crops like cowpea, 
groundnuts, cassava, and yams, which require fewer 
fertiliser inputs. In some instances, especially among 
spouses, men take over control of women’s maize 
crop as it is commercialised. As a result, women who 
grow maize, mainly do so for household food security.
There are several implications of these findings for the 
further development of the MVC. As shown, political 
interest in the value chain has puts smallholder 
farmers at a disadvantage. Thus, the politics behind 
the implementation of Nigeria’s fertiliser subsidy policy 
remain an issue that needs better reconsideration, as 
the movement of subsidised fertiliser from the public to 
the private sector sabotages the government's efforts 
to support smallholder maize farmers. On average, the 
fertiliser subsidy policy tends to have a more significant 
impact on total fertiliser use when administered in 
areas where the private sector has been inactive. This 
is because the initial level of fertiliser use in such areas 
is low compared to areas where the private sector is 
active. To promote and enhance the commercialisation 
of the MVC in Nigeria, the government should therefore 
provide a conducive environment for the private sector 
to play a role in the procurement and distribution of 
agricultural inputs. At the same time, the government 
should maintain its position in quality control and the 
enforcement of policy implementation.
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This paper examines the political economy of the 
MVC in Nigeria to better understand the constraints 
and opportunities for agricultural commercialisation 
in the country. The study was carried out under 
the Agricultural Policy Research in Africa (APRA) 
programme. A political economy framework is used 
to illuminate how groups in society compete for and 
use resources, rents and power to advance their 
interests. Maize was chosen as the focus of the study, 
not only because it is the third most important cereal 
in Nigeria (after sorghum and millet), but also because 
it has a wider range of domestic and industrial uses 
than either of the other main cereals. In addition, maize 
is a politically important crop in Nigeria because its 
domestic demand far outstrips its supply (by about 2 
million t per year). There is an increasing demand for 
maize in the country, mainly because the grain is used 
for livestock feed (predominantly poultry) and serves as 
the primary food for the growing population (Ogunniyi 
2011). Thus, the production and trade of maize attracts 
many stakeholders' political interests, including 
political elites, policy makers, industrial processors, 
and traders. The high demand for maize products 
largely motivates the interest in multiple maize uses, 
such as food, feed, and industrial raw material (Badu-
Apraku and Fokorede 2017). 
The strategic importance of maize in Nigeria is further 
amplified by its role as a source of foreign exchange. 
Beyond serving as a source of food for humans and 
livestock and as a source of foreign exchange, maize 
has multiple alternative uses. This includes the edible 
oil extracted from maize seeds, which is used as an all-
purpose culinary oil. Levulinc acid, a chemical derived 
from maize, is used as an anti-freeze ingredient, 
and can replace toxic petroleum-based ingredients. 
Ethanol obtained from maize is used as a biomass 
fuel. Maize straw is a cheap source of energy in home-
heating furnaces. Maize is also useful in medicines and 
as a raw material for industries. Due to the competing 
uses of maize, by both humans and livestock, there is 
a need to increase its supply level. Studies in maize 
production in different parts of Nigeria have shown the 
increasing importance of the crop amidst its growing 
utilisation by food processing and livestock feed mills 
(Abdulrahman and Kolawole 2008; Ogunsumi, Samuel 
and Adebiyi 2005). Maize has, thus, grown to be a 
local ‘cash crop’, most prominently in the southwest 
of Nigeria, where at least 30 per cent of cropland has 
been allocated to maize production. Growing maize in 
farms of 1–2 ha can overcome hunger in a household, 
and the aggregate effect could double food production 
in Africa (Oladejo and Adetunji 2012).
The starting point for this study is based on the need 
for a comprehensive understanding of the challenges 
facing the MVCs in Nigeria in order to help promote 
equitable strategies for commercialisation. Using a 
political economy framework, three key questions 
are addressed: (1) the key actors and interests: who 
participates and how do they benefit? (2) Rules and 
policies: who makes the rules, and who wins and 
loses? And (3), what are the implications across 
different social groups? The framework situates 
development initiatives within an understanding of 
the prevailing political and economic processes in 
society, specifically, the incentives, relationships 
and distribution and contestation of power between 
different groups and individuals (Tolentino 2010). 
The results of this study show, first, that the political 
interest in the MVC is largely focused on the fertiliser 
inputs required in maize production, as different actors 
tend to benefit from the diversion of government 
subsidised fertiliser for their own gain. The private 
sector processing industries and traders prefer to 
import maize because they profit from the relatively 
lower prices compared to domestically produced 
maize. Second, these political interests in the MVC have 
implications for production and marketing, especially 
for smallholder farmers who are often disadvantaged. 
This is an issue of particular concern because maize 
is a staple food for an estimated 40 per cent of the 
population. Nigerians consume maize as a starchy 
base in a wide variety of food recipes, thus, it plays 
an important role in filling the hunger gap after the dry 
season. With the private sector preferring to import 
maize than to purchase it locally, the government 
imposes export bans from time to time to protect 
domestic consumers. The government attempts to 
limit the importation of maize through the issuance of 
licences that are tightly controlled. Most of the people 
1 INTRODUCTION 
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who are able to get the licenses are closely connected 
to politicians or are themselves politicians.
A third finding is that the social differentiation between 
men and women has direct implications for the 
prospects for commercialisation of the MVC in Nigeria. 
As a commercial or cash crop, Maize’s production 
and sale for commercial purposes is dominated by 
men. Women farmers often view maize production as 
a productive, income-generating activity, yet refrain 
from growing maize because they lack the capital 
to purchase the required inputs, like fertiliser, or hire 
someone to plough the fields. Instead, they cultivate 
maize on a limited scale and continue growing other 
crops like cowpea, groundnuts, cassava, and yams, 
which require fewer fertiliser inputs. In some instances, 
especially among spouses, men take over control 
of women’s maize crop as it is commercialised. As 
a result, women who grow maize, mainly do so for 
household food security.
The paper concludes that the combination of the 
apparent capture of fertiliser subsidies by the private 
sector and the importation of cheaper maize from 
outside Nigeria have significant negative effects on 
attempts to commercialise the MVC. Smallholder 
farmers find it particularly difficult to engage in 
meaningful commercial production of maize, even 
though successive governments have attempted to 
propagate supportive policy environments for this 
to happen. The commercialisation of the MVC could 
serve as an incentive for agricultural households to 
increase their present level of maize supply to bridge 
the gap between production and consumption.
The challenges that the MVC in Nigeria grapples with 
make it very difficult for Nigeria to bridge the current 
deficit between domestic production and demand, 
yet the land that is committed to the production of 
maize annually has the potential to produce adequate 
maize to meet Nigeria’s demand, without having to 
resort to imports. Addressing obstacles that negatively 
affect the MVC would, inter alia, serve as an incentive 
for smallholder famers to ratchet their present maize 
production to levels that would make Nigeria self-
sufficient in maize production to the extent of even 
huge surpluses for export.
The paper is divided into seven sections. Following this 
introduction, Section 2 presents the methodology that 
was used to carry out the study. Section 3 sets the 
context for understanding and analysing the political 
economy of the MVC in Nigeria by briefly examining 
the policy terrain in both historical and contemporary 
context. This section pays particular attention to key 
agricultural policies that have shaped both constraints 
and opportunities in the MVC, as well as the general 
influence of the politics of policy making. Section 
4 presents an overview of the MVC in Nigeria, with 
particular focus on how it has performed between 
2010 and 2019 and the drivers behind its performance. 
Section 5 undertakes a detailed mapping of the MVC, 
outlining its key stages and including an analysis of the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Section 6 details the 
social differentiation processes in the MVC, resulting 
from different contextual issues and policies, with 
particular focus on gendered impacts and outcomes. 
Section 7 makes some concluding reflections.
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The study employed a mixed-methods approach 
(combining qualitative and quantitative tools and 
techniques) in terms of data collection and analysis. 
The operationalisation of both qualitative and 
quantitative methods of data collection was informed 
by a detailed value chain mapping, which is deemed 
critical to understanding the politics of the MVC in 
Nigeria. Value chain mapping examines the different 
maize markets and their requirements, by among 
other methods, drawing a visual representation of the 
MVC. The MVC involves various linkages between 
maize growers, the input and logistical service 
providers, transporters, traders, and retailers. Value 
chain mapping provides a descriptive structure that 
is useful for data generation and analysis. It often 
results in developing a tree-like diagram showing 
the interconnectedness of various actors or their 
input-output relationships. Value chain mapping also 
involves market margin analysis, identifying value 
chain actors, developing an overview of product 
transformation, and estimating the costs arising at 
every stage. This greatly aids understanding of how 
various actors in the chain interact with one another. 
Prior to the fieldwork, the researchers conducted a 
review of related literature, including policy, technical, 
and seed system study reports. The review provided 
some in-depth knowledge of MVC activities in Nigeria. 
An integral component of this study was to solicit 
important information from knowledgeable actors in 
the MVC as key informants (see Annex A for a list of 
the questions key informants were asked). The key 
informants included a mix of representatives from the 
private sector, government organisations, producer 
organisations, and research institutions. Data was 
collected from eight major groups of MVC actors, 
namely: (1) smallholder farmers, (2) commercial farmers, 
(3) fertiliser suppliers, (4) maize processors, (5) seed 
producers/companies, (6) wholesale dealers, (7) credit 
institutions, and (8) policy implementers (see Annex 
B). In selecting the key informants, researchers kept in 
mind what insights their responses would provide into 
issues of mapping the MVC, policy making, and social 
differences within the chain. Researchers purposely 
selected the actors from two States in Nigeria: Kaduna 
and Plateau States – the major maize producing areas 
in Nigeria. At least one representative was selected 
from each of the value chain activities. A KII guide was 
used to guide discussions (see Annex C).
2 METHODOLOGY AND DATA SOURCES
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3.1 Background and framework
As both a staple food and a primary smallholder crop, 
maize plays a dominant role in many people's livelihoods 
in Nigeria. Therefore, identifying appropriate policies 
in the maize sector offers substantial opportunities to 
improve the welfare of people. However, policy change 
in the maize sector rarely comes easily. Maize sector 
policies are often closely aligned with entrenched 
political-economic networks' interests, which can 
stymie efforts towards policy reform (Poulton and 
Kanyinga 2014; Jayne et al. 2002). Challenges 
associated with achieving reforms to maize sector 
policies are highlighted by the often sharp divergence 
between government commitments to market 
liberalisation, on the one hand, and the maintenance or 
expansion of substantial state involvement in the maize 
sector, on the other hand (Kherallah et al. 2002).
There are three ways governments in Nigeria typically 
intervene in the maize sector to achieve political and 
developmental objectives. The first is through output 
market interventions, which include using marketing 
boards to support high farm gate prices for smallholder 
farmers and to lower consumer prices through 
subsidised sales of government stocks, as was the 
case in 1977 (Barrett and Mutambatsere 2008, Ikpi, 
2000). The second is through input subsidy support, 
mainly for maize seed and fertiliser, as was the case in 
1975, when fertiliser procurement and distribution was 
centralised. As a result of this centralisation, all fertiliser 
procurement and distribution activities in Nigeria were 
effectively taken over by the federal government (Jayne 
and Rashid 2013; Ikpi, 2000). Finally, the Nigerian 
government regularly uses trade policy levers, including 
tariffs, export bans, licenses, and quotas, to regulate 
maize supplies and prices, as seen in Nigeria’s border 
closure and policy ban on maize imports in 2019 and 
the removal of the ban in 2020.
For more than a decade, it was thought that increasing 
food imports would address the nation’s food shortage 
problem. However, it has become obvious that rather 
than bringing solutions, such a measure has fuelled 
inflation, discouraged local production, created 
poverty among many farm households, and helped 
to cause food insecurity. This therefore necessitated 
alternative policy actions (Manyong, et. al. 2003). 
Much effort has been geared towards increasing the 
availability and adoption of improved technologies 
in maize production in Nigeria, both at the national 
and State levels. Specifically, in 2006, the federal 
government initiated a programme of doubling maize 
production in Nigeria through promotion of improved 
production technologies, such as fertiliser, hybrid 
seeds, pesticides, herbicides, and better management 
practices. Several improved maize varieties that 
are drought tolerant, tolerant of low nitrogen, Striga 
tolerant, stemborer resistant, and early maturing have 
been deployed to increase production by resource-
poor maize farmers.
Increased public investments in input subsidies, 
combined with greater political attention on maize self-
sufficiency as a prominent policy objective in Nigeria 
has contributed to the use of trade restrictions on 
maize as a policy tool. In addition to contributing to 
deficits and food price spikes, ad hoc bans on private 
cross border trade can serve as valuable patronage 
tools; since such restrictions enable well placed trading 
firms to generate rents through asymmetric knowledge 
of the government’s intended actions in terms of trade. 
Birner and Resnick (2010) draw a political economy 
framework that emphasises critical variables, which 
influence smallholder agricultural policy making, as 
follows:
1. Interest groups and collective action: this variable 
draws attention to the relative political power of 
urban and rural constituencies in terms of the ability 
to organise themselves as well as to exert political 
pressure. This variable can help to explain the 
policy influence of urban over rural groups, and in 
particular the constraints faced by rural smallholder 
farmers in the food crop sector in influencing 
policy, and the policy favouritism for elite rural large 
scale farmers represented by lobbying groups. 
2. Interaction of voters and interest groups with 
politicians: this variable generally assumes 
politicians choose policies that maximise their 
chances of retaining power. An essential element 
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of this is the alignment of governments' policy 
choices and their voting block support bases, 
which may include ethnic groups and urban or 
rural constituencies.
 
3. Type of political regime: this draws attention 
to the interplay between political regime type 
and the strategies deployed by the ruling party 
to retain power within this political structure. 
Intermediate variables, like the existence of multi-
party elections, evidence of opposition party 
participation in policy making, and changes of 
ruling parties through competitive elections, can 
help to explain policy choices and their timing. 
4. Ideas and ideologies: this variable draws attention 
to the beliefs, norms, and values that underlie, either 
explicitly or implicitly, policy choices. Beliefs about 
food security and the relative importance of the 
private and public sectors in achieving development 
objectives figure prominently in the ideological 
underpinnings of agricultural policy making. 
 
5. Social mobilisation: while peasant movements 
have played an essential role in the Asian green 
revolution and land reform movements in Latin 
America, peasant movements have been far less 
politically crucial in Africa. This is perhaps due 
to the higher transaction costs of mobilisation in 
relatively lower density Africa. Urban food riots in 
response to domestic price spikes have been a 
more common feature of the African agricultural 
political economy. Their prevalence likely shapes 
the diversity of policy approaches in the region 
(Walton and Seddon 2008).
Nigeria’s policy focus on input subsidies and trade 
restrictions reflects the powerful interactions between 
a large rural constituency, traditional authorities, and 
indigenous elites with investment interests in maize 
grain and fertiliser trade. These interactions have 
strengthened in the context of the maturation of multi-
party politics in the country, through the distribution 
of private goods, such as inputs, and potentially 
remunerative information on the government’s 
intentions in the area of trade policy.
3.2 Agricultural policies in Nigeria
Sector specific agricultural policies have been largely 
designed to facilitate agricultural marketing, reduce 
agricultural production costs, and enhance agricultural 
product prices as incentives for increased agricultural 
production. Manyong et al. (2003) identified the major 
policy instruments affecting maize in Nigeria as follows: 
1. The Agricultural Commodity Marketing and Pricing 
Policy: the major instruments of the Agricultural 
Commodity Marketing and Pricing Policy were 
six national commodity boards, established in 
1977 to replace the regional, multi-commodity 
boards that had been operating since 1954. The 
six new national commodity boards were for 
cocoa, groundnut, palm produce, cotton, rubber, 
and food grains. The grains marketing board was 
particularly unique as it represented the first effort 
ever made to extend the marketing board system 
to cover food crops. The National Grains Board 
handled maize, millet, sorghum, wheat, rice, and 
cowpeas. It administered a guaranteed minimum 
price policy, whereby floor prices were nationally 
set for each of the six grain crops at guaranteed 
minimum prices. This meant the Board would 
intervene as a buyer of last resort if and when 
regular market prices fell below the guaranteed 
minimum. The Board also operated a strategic 
grain reserve scheme.
2. Input supply and distribution policies: government 
policy on input supply and distribution focused on 
instruments for ensuring the adequate and orderly 
supply of modern inputs like fertilisers, agro-
chemicals, seed and seedlings, machinery and 
equipment, and so on. The key policy instruments 
adopted were as follows: first, the centralisation 
of fertiliser procurement and distribution in 1975. 
This resulted in all fertiliser procurement and 
distribution activities in Nigeria being effectively 
taken over by the federal government. The federal 
government also established a superphosphate 
fertiliser plant to reduce the country’s dependence 
on foreign sources of fertiliser. Second, the 
creation of a national network of agro-service 
centres to facilitate the distribution of modern 
inputs, including the provision of tractor and farm 
machinery services to farmers. Third, the creation 
of a National Seed Service in 1972 to produce 
and multiply improved rice, maize, cowpea, millet, 
sorghum, wheat, and cassava seed.
3. Agricultural input subsidy policies: as far back as 
the 1950s, various regional governments in Nigeria 
were already subsidising the prices of key inputs, 
especially the prices of agro-chemicals used in 
the production of groundnut, cotton, cocoa, palm 
produce, and other export crops. In the early 
1970s, input subsidy policy was centralised, and 
its application extended to food crops. The policy 
instruments adopted comprised of the following:
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i. Fertiliser subsidy: between 1976 and 1979, 
fertilisers were 75 per cent subsidised by 
the federal government. In 1980, the federal 
government’s share was reduced to 50 per 
cent, while the State governments were 
required to absorb the remaining 25 per cent. 
However, the total percentage subsidy was 
subsequently reduced to 50 per cent in 1987. 
 
ii. Seed subsidy: a 50 per cent or more subsidy 
on various improved seeds produced by the 
National Seed Service was introduced in 1987. 
 
iii. Subsidy on agro-chemicals: rates of subsidy 
on agro-chemicals varied, but they were 
generally over 50 per cent in the late 1990s. 
 
iv. Subsidy on tractor hire services: subsidies on 
tractor hire services, which mostly operated 
at the State level, ranged from about 25 
per cent to about 50 per cent of the actual 
cost of tractor services in the late 1990s. 
learning
4. Agricultural Mechanization Policy: The need for 
a coherent agricultural mechanisation policy 
became very pressing in the early 1970s in view of 
an increasing shortage of agricultural labour that 
necessitated the substitution of human labour for 
some appropriate forms of mechanical power. In an 
attempt to achieve the objectives of the Agricultural 
Mechanization Policy, the following policy 
instruments were introduced in the late 1990s: 
i. The operation of Tractor Hire Units by States. 
  
ii. Liberalised import policies in respect to 
tractors and agricultural equipment. 
iii. A massive assistance programme to help 
farmers with land clearing through cost 
subsidies. 
iv. The launch of a machinery ownership scheme 
in 1980, under which the federal government 
provided half of the purchase cost of farm 
machinery to be owned and used by farming 
cooperatives or group farms.
5. Water Resources and Irrigation Policy: the major 
instrument of the Water Resources and Irrigation 
Policy was the establishment of eleven River Basin 
Development Authorities in 1977, with overriding 
responsibility for the development of the country’s 
land and water resources. The River Basin 
Development Authorities had a mandate for land 
preparation, development of irrigation facilities, and 
construction of dams, boreholes, and roads. They 
were also involved in the distribution of farm and 
fishing inputs. Under the civilian regime, between 
1979 and 1983, they became the major instrument 
of the government’s direct agricultural production 
through large scale mechanised farming. 
6. The Agricultural Transformation Agenda (ATA): 
the ATA of the former President Jonathan’s 
administration identified seven sectors as the 
main growth drivers during the transformation 
period, 2011–2015, including agriculture, water 
resources, solid minerals, manufacturing, oil 
and gas, trade and commerce, and culture and 
tourism. This selection was prompted by the 
fact that the performance in these sectors has 
been constrained by several challenges. Such 
challenges included low productivity; low levels of 
private sector investment; non-competitiveness; 
inadequate funding; shortage of skilled manpower; 
low investment in research and development; 
poor development of value chains and low value 
addition; a poor regulatory environment; the poor 
quality of goods and services and the poor state 
of physical infrastructure; policy instability and 
discontinuity; low levels of technology; paucity 
and poor flow of information; and the high cost 
of doing business. Government, thus, assumed 
a baseline GDP growth rate of 11.7 per cent per 
annum between 2011 and 2015, which translated 
to real and nominal GDP of about ₦428.6 billion 
and ₦73.2 trillion, respectively, at the end of the 
programme period.
7. The Agriculture Promotion Policy (APP): the Buhari 
administration launched the APP mid-year in 2016. 
The APP, which builds on the ATA of President 
Jonathan’s administration, is aimed at creating 
employment, ensuring food security, eliminating 
poverty, and repositioning the nation’s economy. 
APP’s strategic thrust is aimed at increased 
productivity, the promotion of private sector 
investment, and strengthening institutions, as a 
basis for better service delivery and development 
8. The Presidential Fertiliser Initiative: this programme 
was informed by the need to stop the importation 
of fertiliser and make use of the large supply of 
locally available urea and limestone, which make 
up 65 per cent of the raw materials required for 
fertiliser production. The Presidential Fertiliser 
Initiative was based on an agreement in December 
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2016 between the Nigerian federal government, 
the Fertiliser Producers and Suppliers Association 
of Nigeria, and the Moroccan government to 
supply Nigeria with phosphate. With funds 
provided by the Nigerian Sovereign Investment 
Authority, by 2017, 12 out of the 28 abandoned 
fertiliser plants became operational again. This 
initiative led to a drastic reduction in the cost 
of fertiliser. While a 50kg bag of fertiliser sold 
for ₦14,000 in 2016; after the initiative was 
introduced, a bag of NPK fertiliser cost farmers 
₦5,500, as a result of the reactivated plants. 
 
An overview of the political landscape of Nigeria brings 
to light that, despite the trillions of naira that the nation 
has sunk into the execution of these various policies 
and programmes, Nigeria is still dependent on the 
importation of maize and various classes of food to 
feed the population (Manyong et al. 2003). Thus, as 
a result of poor policy implementation, Nigeria is still 
dependent on food imports.
3.3 Political influences on policy making
Nigeria’s political settlement is based on power 
relationships between elite members of society. The 
way these elites, especially politicians, relate to ordinary 
citizens is important for understanding the influences 
on Nigeria’s agricultural policies, which impact the 
commercialisation of the MVC. Poulton and Chinsinga 
(2018) distinguish four basic ways politicians may seek 
to obtain or maintain the support of ordinary citizens, 
the examples they give focus on rural citizens. Firstly, 
politicians may seek to obtain or maintain ordinary 
citizens’ support by creating conditions conducive to 
economic growth. Growth creates employment and 
livelihood opportunities, as well as new experiences 
for consumers. Voters in Africa assess governments 
on their performance in delivering growth, as well as 
on perceptions of high-level governance, just as they 
do elsewhere (Bratton, Bhavnani, and Chen 2011). 
Moreover, growth can be a much more cost-efficient 
way of spreading benefits to voters than distributing 
vast numbers of individual transfers (Kitschelt and 
Wilkinson 2007). The ATA is an example of how the 
Jonathan administration sought to obtain support from 
Nigerian citizens by promoting economic growth.
Secondly, politicians may seek to obtain or maintain 
ordinary citizens’ support by making investments that 
benefit them directly and by delivering reliable public 
services to them. However, African governments’ 
track record in making investments that benefit rural 
citizens and providing services to them is mixed. Public 
spending is an imperfect proxy for quality investment 
and service delivery, and agriculture is only one sector 
of interest to rural citizens (albeit an important one). 
The failure of most African governments to fulfil their 
spending commitments for agriculture – enacted in 
Maputo in 2003 and reiterated in Malabo in 2014 – is 
telling. To enhance growth and development along the 
MVC, the Nigerian government came up with specific 
initiatives such as easy access to finance through (i) 
the Nigeria Incentive-based Risk-Sharing System for 
Agricultural Lending (NIRSAL) and (ii) the Commercial 
Agriculture Credit Scheme (CACS). Varying levels 
of success have been achieved through these 
investments in Nigeria’s MVC. Another remarkable 
initiative is investment in innovation through research 
institutes. Here, the International Institute of Tropical 
Agriculture (IITA) and other agriculture institutions focus 
on introducing improved maize varieties, developed 
through biotechnology and genetic breeding, to the 
local value chains.
Thirdly, politicians may seek to obtain or maintain 
ordinary citizens’ support by distributing transfer rents to 
them. These can range from token handouts of cash and 
cheap goods at election time to formal developmental 
programmes, such as the agricultural input subsidies 
provided by the Nigerian government. Where transfers 
are highly discretionary, it perpetuates a system of 
patron-client relationships in rural areas – the inverse 
of empowered citizens holding elected representatives 
to account for their performance in service delivery. By 
contrast, where transfer programmes are effectively 
researched and appropriately targeted, they can 
usefully support productive activity (Devereux and 
Sabates-Wheeler 2004; Chinsinga and Poulton 2014). 
Nevertheless, on their own, rent transfers are unlikely 
to be effective instruments to promote smallholder 
agricultural commercialisation.
Finally, politicians may seek to maintain the support 
(active or passive) of ordinary citizens by various forms 
of political or social control. A soft version of this is to 
keep close links with opinion formers within a particular 
community or ethnic group – possibly involving some 
form of rent flows to these opinion formers – such that 
the political allegiance of that community or ethnic 
group remains with the party or regime (Poulton 
and Chinsinga 2018). This can be reinforced by a 
conspicuous presence in an area, giving credibility 
to the party's claims to understand the needs of the 
citizens there, and perhaps by campaigning rhetoric 
that spreads fear of the less-present alternatives. In a 
more autocratic variant, an expectation is created that 
ordinary citizens of an area will be loyal to the party 
or regime. Those who question this may be subjected 
to surveillance or denied access to land or other 
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resources (e.g. government transfers or participation 
in donor projects). They may ultimately be arrested or 
worse if they openly challenge the party or regime. In 
Nigeria, politicians have sought to maintain the support 
of smallholder farmers through agricultural subsidies 
(especially fertilisers and improved seeds).
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4.1 An overview of the MVC in Nigeria
Gibbon (2001) described a value chain as a chain of 
activities where products pass through each activity, 
gaining some value at every stage in the chain. In 
other words, value chains are mechanisms that are 
separated by different actors, such as producers, 
processors, buyers, sellers, and consumers. A value 
chain encompasses the relationships between these 
actors as they move products from fields through to 
the end markets.
The political dimension of the MVC in Nigeria revolves 
around input supply, especially fertiliser; trading in 
maize, especially imports; and sales or supply to 
processing industries. These dimensions tend to have 
implications for other stakeholders in the value chain, 
especially smallholder producers, wholesalers, and 
retailers engaged in domestic trade.
To support production at the start of the chain, between 
2011 and 2015, farmers – especially smallholders – 
obtained inputs like seeds and fertilisers through two 
main avenues:
• The government’s Growth Enhancement 
Scheme (GES) – a voucher based input subsidy 
programme accessed through private agro-input 
dealers (operating in networks or as individuals).
• Out-grower schemes (or contract farming)
Accessing inputs through the government’s GES 
benefitted and empowered smallholder farmers to 
purchase quality fertiliser at subsidised rates under the 
ATA (2011–2015). Among other measures, the scheme 
encouraged the private sector to commercialise 
seed production and fertiliser distribution, moving 
away from a flat price fertiliser subsidy towards 
targeted support to smallholder farmers. The project 
drastically enhanced smallholders’ access to quality 
inputs, which hitherto was non-existent. The objective 
of the GES was to provide affordable and quality 
agricultural inputs to farmers actively engaged in 
production through input price subsidies, removing 
the complexities associated with fertiliser distribution, 
and encouraging input suppliers to work with farmers 
to improve productivity. Consequently, smallholders 
spent less on agricultural inputs and were assured 
of quality inputs, which translated into increases in 
production. While the scheme helped smallholder 
farmers, it was a disadvantage to political elites, who 
benefitted from direct government procurement and 
distribution of fertiliser.
There are multiple levels of intermediation in the market 
post-production, which operate at varying scales of 
operation and provide different services. Smallholders 
sell to local traders, who buy maize for their retail stocks 
from farm gates, or from collection points if they are 
more prominent traders. As smallholders’ marketable 
surpluses increase, they sell further downstream in 
the marketing chain to larger aggregators or directly to 
processors. Likewise, intermediaries of differing sizes 
serve as aggregators at different scales. Among the 
largest aggregators, unprocessed maize is ultimately 
sold directly to processors or at Dawanu market in 
Kano, Kano State (the largest grain market in West 
Africa). The largest traders and trade groups may 
transact as much as 10,000t of maize grain per annum 
(Dahlberg 2012).
There are currently only a few instances where 
aggregators are wholesale marketers engaged in 
contract farming with smallholders. The majority of 
these aggregators sell contracted maize to poultry 
feed millers (concentrated in Ibadan and Lagos areas). 
Overall, feed mills account for 60–70 per cent of the 
maize grain processed in the country, with poultry 
farms consuming about 95 per cent of the feed 
produced (Table 4.1). Breweries purchase 10 per cent 
of processed maize, while millers producing branded 
flours for human consumption account for 20 per cent 
(Dahlberg 2012). Although cash payment at delivery 
dominates aggregator–smallholder transactions, the 
less common contract farming arrangements involve 
advanced purchase commitments and input provision 
by aggregators to enhance production. Prices differ to 
roughly reflect the intermediary services, for instance, 
smallholders that transport maize to a collection point 
will fetch a higher price than when aggregators pick up 
maize at the farm gate. Maize pricing is also dependent 
on grain quality, which is determined primarily by 
4 AN OVERVIEW OF THE MVC IN NIGERIA: 
EXAMINING ITS RECENT PERFORMANCE 
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market intermediaries, like commission agents, and 
based mainly on grain moisture levels and cleanliness. 
Smallholders’ price negotiating skills also have an 
influence on the final grain price.
4.2  Performance of the MVC in 
Nigeria (2010–2019)
4.2.1 Production and processing
Data from FAO Agricultural Marketing Information 
System (AMIS) (2020) (Table 4.2) indicates maize 
production has continued to rise from 7.68 million 
t in 2010–11 to about 11 million t in 2019–20, with 
yields fluctuating from 1.78t/ha to 2.55t/ha between 
these years (peaking at 2.57t/ha in 2017–18). Despite 
a decline in yield and production in the 2015–16 and 
2016–17 production years, production increased 
to 11.8 million t and 11.3 million t in the 2017–18 and 
2018–19 production years, respectively. Increases in 
yield and production from 2011 through to 2018 are 
likely due to GES and phase two of the Maximising 
Agricultural Revenue and Key Enterprises in Targeted 
Sites (MARKETS II) initiatives, which gave farmers 
access to subsidised farm inputs, especially fertiliser, 
improved maize seeds, and support services.
4.2.2 Categories of farmers in the MVC
KIIs with primary maize producers in the MVC reveal 
three categories of farmers (see Annex B): (1) the 
wet season farmers (the Maize Farmers’ Association 
[MFA]); (2) the dry season farmers (the Fadama Maize 
Producers Association [FMPA]); and (3) commercial 
maize farmers (CMFs).
a) The MFA: smallholders in the MFA are only involved 
in production activities during the wet season (May–
October). During the KIIs, these farmers stated that, 
all things being equal, maize production is profitable. 
Farmers source their production inputs (seeds, fertiliser, 
pesticides) and sell their products in local markets. 
However, the input and product market dynamics are 
greatly affected by changes in government policies 
and regimes. MFA members attested that they had 
benefitted from improved access to quality fertilisers 
at lower prices under the ATA (2011–2015), compared 
to the preceding period (2007–2010). The advent of 
the ATA witnessed a significant reform that addressed 























7.68 8.88 8.70 10.38 10.90 9.54 9.60 11.08 11.03 11.00
Area harvested 
(million ha)
4.32 4.32 4.32 4.32 4.32 4.32 4.32 4.32 4.32 4.32
Yield (t/ha) 1.78 2.06 2.02 2.41 2.53 2.21 2.22 2.57 2.56 2.55
Source: NASC (2015)























Total supply 8.12 9.40 9.64 11.07 11.95 11.24 11.32 12.46 12.73 13.40
Opening stocks 0.34 0.32 0.75 0.49 0.85 1.30 1.19 0.98 1.30 2.00
Production 7.68 8.88 8.70 10.38 10.90 9.54 9.60 11.08 11.03 11.00
Imports 0.10 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.40 0.53 0.40 0.40 0.40
Total utilisation 8.12 9.40 9.64 11.07 11.95 11.24 11.32 12.46 12.73 13.40
Domestic utilisation 7.30 8.35 9.10 10.07 10.50 9.90 10.18 11.01 10.58 11.25
Food use 5.10 5.35 5.60 6.37 6.70 5.90 6.18 6.31 6.08 6.25
Feed use 0.70 1.00 1.50 1.50 1.50 2.00 2.00 2.20 2.00 2.00
Other uses 1.50 2.00 2.00 2.20 2.30 2.00 2.00 2.50 2.50 3.00
Exports 0.50 0.30 0.05 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
Closing stocks 0.32 0.75 0.49 0.85 1.30 1.19 0.98 1.30 2.00 2.00
Source: FAO AMIS, (2020)
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corruption and inefficiency in the distribution and 
marketing of fertiliser to smallholder farmers. As a 
result, the policy has improved farmers’ access to 
and use of fertiliser (Amaza 2019). The KIIs indicated 
that smallholder farmers have accessed agricultural 
inputs with relative ease under the ATA, which was 
introduced by the previous administration to address 
technology gaps. Since the ATA ended in 2015, 
farmers have been able to access fertiliser from the 
private sector free market.
b) The FMPA: smallholders in the FMPA confirmed that 
producing maize during the dry season (November–
May), using irrigation and supplementary water supply 
from near-by water sources (rivers, streams, wells/
wash boreholes) is more profitable compared to maize 
production during the wet season. KIIs with FMPA 
established that they mainly produce maize for fresh 
consumption and seed production. They explained 
that fresh maize is in relatively high demand during the 
dry season, hence, prices are higher, which increases 
their income.
c) The CMFs: CMFs produce maize on large farms, 
usually over 50ha, or more. Their production is often 
associated with the use of improved technologies and 
efficient agricultural practices. For example, Baban 
Gona, a commercial maize farm located in Ikara local 
government area (LGA), Kaduna State, has 110 full-time 
staff and 700 contract staff. CMFs source their inputs 
locally from major farm inputs and fertiliser dealers 
in the State. CMFs often market harvested maize 
directly to processing industries, like Nestlé and Grand 
Cereals, and in local markets. Unlike smallholders, 
CMFs’ access to inputs is not affected by government 
regime changes, as they tend to source their inputs in 
large quantities and do not rely on government subsidy 
policy. This is because most CMFs are politically 
influential individuals. Hence, they use their influence to 
access the required fertiliser.
Intermediaries of differing sizes operate as processors, 
including feed mills, breweries, food processors, and 
flour mills. KIIs held with staff at Hybrid Feed Limited 
indicated that the firm engages in the production of 
feed for livestock and fisheries. The company has 
a staff capacity of 200 permanent staff and 300 
casual staff. The firm sources maize grain locally from 
suppliers and farmers.
4.2.3 Consumption and utilisation
A survey by the IITA (2012) in Northern Nigeria revealed 
that almost all households surveyed consumed maize 
almost daily, reflecting its demand, availability, and 
affordability. According to the International Maize and 
Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT) and IITA (2010), 
approximately 60 per cent of the maize produced in 
the country is for industrial end uses (humans and 
livestock). FAO (2020) (Table 4.2) estimate the total 
utilisation of maize increased steadily between the 
2010–11 and 2014–15 production years, declining in 
the 2015–16 and 2016–17 production years, and then 
increasing again in the 2017–18, 2018–19, and 2019–
20 production years. The same trend was observed 
in domestic utilisation of maize for food, feed, and 
other uses, except in the 2015–16 production year, 
when maize feed consumption increased, whilst maize 
food consumption declined. The decline in maize food 
consumption in 2015–16 reflected a supply shortage of 
maize for human food, which was likely due to increases 
in feed milling operations to produce large amounts of 
heat-treated mash and pelleted feed for fish and poultry 
by Olam and Dantee farms in 2016 (Sahel Consulting 
2017), and the scrapping of the GES in 2015.
4.2.4 Marketing and trade 
Most of the maize produced in Nigeria is directed to 
the domestic market due to the growing demand, 
with a negligible part of the output formally exported 
(FAOSTAT 2012; Table 4.2). The development of the 
feed and food industries in Nigeria has increased local 
demand for maize. A ban on maize import and export 
was introduced in July 2019 to meet the growing 
domestic demand for maize by industrial processors, 
especially livestock feed producers. Findings from the 
KIIs with smallholder farmers in the MFA, the FMPA 
and CMF categories indicate that they all sell their 
maize grains at markets and to processors locally. 
In the rainfall season, the price of dry maize, referred 
to as ‘old maize’, increases significantly due to lower 
supply. Grain merchants in northern Nigeria, who are 
often well-connected local politicians or businessmen, 
store up grain during its peak availability and sell it 
at higher prices to food processors and feed mills in 
the off-season. Fadama farmers also indicated that 
‘fresh maize on the cob’ is in high demand in the dry 
season and therefore profitable. KIIs with wholesale 
traders confirmed that they purchase maize grain from 
farmers in satellite and local markets and supply it to 
an array of food processors and feed mills after harvest 
(November–April). It is worth mentioning the direct entry 
of agents of processing companies into the markets to 
purchase grain immediately after harvest to compete 
with other buyers and reduce their costs.
Trade data for exports (Table 4.2) indicate a negligible 
quantity of maize exported to other countries from 
Nigeria. The largest export amount was 0.5 million t 
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in 2010–11, which declined to 0.3 million t and 50,000t 
in 2011–12 and 2012–13, respectively. A steady export 
quantity of 0.15 million t per annum was maintained 
between 2013–14 and 2019–20. In the same vein, 0.2 
million t of maize was imported between the 2010–11 
and 2013–14 production years. The level of imports 
increased to 0.4 million t in 2015–16, peaking in 2016–
17 at 0.53 million t, before declining back to 0.4 million 
t in 2017–18.  This level of imports was maintained 
through to the 2019–20 production year. 
Due to the growing demand for maize in the feed 
sector, large feed mills and poultry farms occasionally 
obtain import permits for purchasing foreign maize 
when they anticipate a significant domestic supply 
shortfall. However, due to the national business 
strategy to source maize from domestic suppliers, the 
Nigerian government imposes strict foreign exchange 
measures, making it challenging to obtain import 
and export permits. The underlying factors that drive 
the restriction of foreign exchange for imports of 
maize include i) to ensure supply is purchased from 
domestic sources and generate higher prices for 
smallholder farmers; and ii) to curtail the diversion 
of foreign exchange by importers for other profitable 
purposes instead of reinvestment in maize. For over a 
decade, Nigeria has maintained a 5 per cent tariff on 
imported maize, in addition to stringent import permit 
requirements. Despite the strict foreign exchange 
measures, politically well-connected business people 
undertake some informal regional trade. Hence, 
Nigeria’s reported maize import and export volumes 
are not entirely accurate (Sahel Consulting 2017). The 
Dawanu market in Kano, Kano State, is the primary 
centre for informal maize exports. 
Challenges remain in Nigeria’s domestic and 
international trade, including the high cost of 
transportation, poor and sparse road networks, the 
long distances from farms to markets, inadequate 
market information to identify domestic and external 
opportunities, and poor infrastructure (USDA 2012). 
Limited understanding of key export markets (such as 
the EU, UK, and US) and the low quality of agricultural 
products has also hindered international trade.
4.3 The drivers of the MVC in Nigeria 
(2010–2019)
4.3.1 Public sector driven land acquisition and 
productivity growth
Over the years, agricultural production in Nigeria has 
been impacted by input challenges. Local farmers 
have lacked the required seedlings, fertilisers, land, 
and water for production activities. Additionally, the 
process of securing land is time consuming and 
expensive, which discourages agricultural activities. 
Political considerations often influence access to 
land, with political elites and politically well-connected 
individuals having better access to fertile land. 
The significant constraints associated with Nigeria's 
current land use legislation include:
 
• The lack of existing land policies to guide land 
management in Nigeria. The Land Use Act 
introduced in 1978 did not assign any critical 
control over land and land management to the 
federal government, besides the Council of States' 
advisory role. The lack of a national technical body 
to assist and advise the Council of States has 
hindered it from developing the needed regulations 
for effective and efficient land law implementation. 
• The Current Land Use Act does not encourage 
private sector investment in agriculture and 
agriculture related activities (e.g. short-term 
leases do not enable farmers to access 
agricultural loans,particularly smallholder farmers). 
• The process of securing a land title is 
cumbersome, time consuming, and often expensive. 
 
• The implementation of the Land Use Act has not 
ensured women's inclusion in agriculture, i.e. 
gender biases in access to land mean that women 
face more difficulty in accessing land than men. 
• Land grabbing has resulted in communities being 
dispossessed of large areas of land (Amaza 2019).
The process of land acquisition has implications for 
maize production, whereby smallholder farmers can 
only access family land and rented or leased land to 
grow maize. Thus, this tends to limit the land area 
under cultivation. Smallholder farmers therefore have 
limited or no security of tenure, which limits their ability 
to access capital and invest in farmland. 
The ATA (2011–2015) encouraged State governments 
to launch different initiatives to ease land acquisition 
for agricultural purposes. For example, Edo State 
subsidised land acquisition costs and eased the 
Certificate of Occupancy acquisition process. Similarly, 
in 2016 Anambra State promoted improved community 
relations to facilitate a conflict-free land acquisition 
process, while enacting the Land Acquisition Act 
(2016) to smoothen land transfers.  
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Building on the regional momentum of the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) (2001) 
and the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development 
Programme (CAADP) (2003), the ATA took measures 
to increase food production and to develop the 
agricultural sector through commercialisation. 
The ATA focused on addressing input challenges, 
which resulted in policies that facilitated the supply 
of subsidised seeds and fertilisers to 18 per cent of 
farmers in Nigeria (estimated at 12–14 million). The key 
stakeholders in the MVC, behind the ATA, include policy 
makers, research institutes, seed companies, livestock 
feed manufacturers, input suppliers (primarily fertiliser 
suppliers), and credit institutions. The implementation 
of ATA had a positive impact on maize production. The 
total output of maize grew by 19 per cent from 8.88 
million t in 2011 to 10.56 million t in 2015. This was an 
improvement from the prior period, when maize output 
increased by 14 per cent, from 6.72 million t in 2007 to 
7.68 million t in 2010 (FAO 2019).
 
The ATA, which was succeeded by the APP (2016–
2020), defined agriculture as a business and one of 
its initiatives was to promote private sector investment 
in agriculture. The Agenda also encouraged the 
development of private sector driven marketing 
organisations and the promotion of the NIRSAL 
scheme, targeting maize as a primary value chain to be 
developed in the North Central region. These initiatives 
were activated through a three tier government 
structure: through the federal, State, and local 
governments. While the federal government provided 
general guidance on the ATA and macroeconomic 
framework, the State and local governments oversaw 
its implementation. Input procurement and distribution, 
investment in rural infrastructure, and the promotion 
of marketing institutions were addressed at the State 
level, while the local governments oversaw the local 
provision of infrastructure (FMARD 2010). Three 
initiatives under the ATA had a far-reaching impact on 
the MVC:
a) Price support and input subsidy measures 
established by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and 
the Bankers’ Committee, and NIRSAL encouraged 
lending in the agricultural sector by guaranteeing that 
up to 75 per cent of loans were allocated to agricultural 
value chains, including maize. NIRSAL also insured 
about 50 and 75 per cent of losses incurred by large 
and small to medium scale farmers. Meanwhile, the 
GES linked smallholders to private businesses for 
subsidised inputs and support services. 
b) The Commercial Agriculture Credit Scheme 
(CACS) was designed to lend at 9 per cent interest rates 
to entities involved in cash and food crop value chains, 
including maize, poultry, livestock, and aquaculture. A 
sum of ₦200 billion (roughly US$1.3 billion) has been 
allocated for the scheme, which has been extended 
to September 2025. The principal beneficiaries of this 
scheme are large scale businesses, who often double 
as political elites. They benefit from assured sources 
of maize supply, usually in the required quantities, 
through contract supply agreements. 
c) Doubling maize production: the IITA and other 
research institutions in the African crop space focus 
on developing and introducing improved varieties to 
local value chains through biotechnology and genetic 
breeding. Their work has led to the creation of maize 
varieties resistant to Striga parasites, P48W01 and 
P48W02, known as IITA IR-Maize Hybrid 2 and IITA 
IR-Maize Hybrid 4, respectively. These improved maize 
varieties have a yielding potential of 5t/ha compared 
to the 1t/ha yield potential of the local varieties 
commonly used. Findings from the KIIs conducted 
for this study indicate that over the years, the Institute 
for Agricultural Research, in collaboration with IITA, 
has achieved remarkable strides in the development 
of maize technologies. Together these institutes have 
developed about 58 improved open pollinated varieties 
(OPV)/hybrid maize varieties. The significant varieties 
include striga  and stem borer resistant maize varieties, 
drought-tolerant maize, pro-vitamin maize, and quality 
protein maize. Many of the varieties have been adopted 
by farmers, especially in North Central Nigeria, where 
commercial production takes place. The improved 
varieties have helped to increase the productivity of 
maize from an average of 1.5t/ha to 2.55t/ha, (see 
Table 4.1), just shy of the target 3t/ha required to double 
maize production.
4.3.2   Private sector led input delivery and farm 
advisory services
The private sector in Nigeria has the potential to supply 
agricultural inputs in a cost effective manner. There 
are several private companies who have entered the 
fertiliser and seed business during the last few years. 
The agricultural or farm supply companies in various 
States are also involved in the distribution of inputs. The 
commercialisation or privatisation of these companies 
offer additional potential for developing private sector 
based distribution channels in rural areas. Hitherto, due 
to the public sector monopoly, all these privately owned 
organisations have not had an opportunity to develop 
the necessary skills needed for efficient marketing 
and market development. Nevertheless, private sector 
led initiatives to provide inputs and advisory services 
to farmers are presently emerging. Based in Kaduna 
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State, Babban Gona, for example, seeks to improve 
the livelihoods of 1 million smallholder maize farmers. 
Babban Gona (‘Great Farm’ in Hausa) was established 
in 2012 as a financially sustainable and scalable 
agricultural enterprise co-owned by its farmers. The 
company provides cost-effective end-to-end services 
to a network of franchise farmer groups on credit 
repayable at the end of the season. These services 
include training in sustainable farming; soil analysis; 
crop insurance; access to storage facilities, including 
a warehouse receipt programme; the marketing and 
distribution of products; and access to credit, fertiliser, 
and seeds. Babban Gona operates by franchising 
‘farmer groups’ and partnering with farmers who have 
5ha under cultivation. Since Babban Gona launched 
in 2012, participating farmers have benefitted from 
a 3.5 times increase in income from their harvests 
(Sahel Consulting 2017).
Maize farmers in Nigeria are also gaining access to 
inputs and advisory services through cooperative 
membership. A cooperative association is described 
as the collaboration of people in groups that come 
together voluntarily to meet their common social, 
economic, and cultural needs and aspirations by 
pooling their resources and efforts together (ICA 1996). 
Such groups are jointly owned and democratically 
controlled by their members. Bakari (2016) and Ajibefun 
(2006) acknowledge that the act of pooling resources 
together to fulfil common goals could have a significant 
impact on productivity. The benefits of membership 
of such associations include higher sales bargaining 
power, guaranteed access to credit, the bulk purchase 
of farm inputs, and access to extension services. In 
Nigeria’s MVC, membership of such groups has served 
as a channel through which information, extension, 
and technology is disseminated to farmers to help 
maximise yields.
4.3.3 High local demand
The production of maize has increased due to high 
local demand – particularly from the feed industry – 
rising prices, and controlled imports. A specific driver 
of MVC development in Nigeria is the growth of the 
poultry sector, which relies on maize as the primary 
feed ingredient. Those engaged in poultry farming 
include both small and large poultry producers. The 
large poultry producers are often well-connected 
politically, and in some cases, they also own livestock 
feed businesses. Hence, they tend to have political 
influence in dictating developments in the MVC to their 
advantage, by influencing maize import policies, for 
instance. Dayntee Farms Ltd, for example, is a large 
commercial poultry farm located in Kwara State, which 
began operations in 2012. Dayntee Farms Ltd currently 
sells eggs, day-old chicks, and point-of-lay birds. 
The Fund for Agricultural Finance in Nigeria invested 
in Dayntee in 2016 to enable the farm to expand its 
production capacity amidst the rising domestic 
demand for animal protein. On average, Dayntee buys 
170t of maize per month from farmers and traders in 
northern Nigeria for its feed formulation. 
With feed costs maintained at their current prices, 
Lyddon (2019) reports that Nigeria's poultry meat 
consumption will increase tenfold between 2018 
and 2040. This means, domestic poultry production 
could increase by 8 billion eggs and 100 million kg 
of poultry meat per annum between the same period. 
Additionally, Nigeria's yearly fish consumption is 
currently estimated at 2 million t, with over 20 per cent 
supplied through land-based aquaculture production. 
The scale of the poultry and aquaculture sectors 
has ensured Nigeria's animal feed sector, currently 
estimated at more than US$2 billion, continues to 
attract significant local and foreign investment in large 
scale feed mill operations. The growing feed sector 
therefore constitutes a major market for maize grain 
and acts as a key driver for MVC development.
As one of the major Nigerian staples, there is also 
a high demand for maize for human consumption. 
Hence, institutions like Harvest Plus have pushed for 
mainstream maize bio-fortification through ‘Scaling Up 
Bio Fortification Investment in Nigeria’. Harvest Plus' 
vision is to reach 1 billion people with bio-fortified foods 
by 2030. Additionally, organisations like Nestlé (Golden 
Morn and Cerelac), flour mills (Daily Delight), NASCO 
(cornflakes), and AACE Foods (Soya Maize and Soso 
Nourish) fortify their maize products, which reach 
millions of people, with vitamins and minerals (Sahel 
Consulting 2017). The increased micronutrient content 
of bio-fortified maize has further increased demand for 
maize grain and driven MVC development.
4.3.4 Integrating women and youth in the MVC
Recognising the limitations facing women and youth 
in the MVC in Nigeria, initiatives have been developed 
to increase their business opportunities in commercial 
agriculture. These initiatives include the provision of 
training programmes that aim to ensure 50 and 30 
per cent of actors in the MVC are women and youth, 
respectively (Amaza et al. 2018). For example, in 
2017 the MARKETS II project established systemic 
approaches to facilitate and integrate youth and 
women into agricultural value chains (including maize). 
The project trained women in the use of sprayers for 
pesticide application and youth in the micro-processing 
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of maize and other maize-based foods. To be inclusive, 
MARKETS II reduced the threshold requirement to 
participate in the project from 1ha to 0.5ha, since 
women’s and youths’ access to land for production 
is often reliant on family members (husbands, fathers, 
male relatives) granting them land, rented land, or land 
leased from community leaders or other influential 
community members.
 
The social differentiation between men and women 
has an implication for the commercialisation of the 
MVC in Nigeria. Generally, in Africa, including Nigeria, 
men and women have different preferences and 
criteria for choosing which crops to grow (Guende 
2009). Being a commercial or cash crop, maize’s 
production and sale is dominated by men. In some 
instances, especially among spouses, men take over 
control of women’s maize crop as it is commercialised 
(Durfeldt 2017). For these reasons, women who grow 
maize, mainly do so for household food security 
and use market sales to meet household needs. 
Women are unable to increase their production of 
maize because of the many challenges relate to 
non-ownership of land, lack of credit and inability to 
penetrate market cartels. This limits the quantity of 
maize available in markets in Nigeria.
The MARKET II project has improved women’s 
and youths’ employment opportunities and offered 
nutritious food products and food security to more 
households and communities (Amaza et al. 2018). In 
line with the global experience, Amaza et al. (2018) 
found that women’s access to increased income 
results in three major changes in the family, namely: 
investment in other income generating activities, the 
ability to meet household needs (like food, education, 
and health care), and the creation of savings for 
unexpected events.
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5 DETAILED VALUE CHAIN MAPPING: 
ACTORS, PROCESSES AND CHALLENGES
5.1 Actors and markets
Value chain mapping involves identifying the actors, 
the product transformation, and the estimated costs 
arising at every stage of the value chain. Mapping the 
value chain components, the linkages, and actors can, 
among other benefits, facilitate a structured discussion 
about the opportunities and constraints that producers 
and other actors face, as well as what could be done 
to address them. Understanding the opportunities and 
limitations of producers within a given value chain helps 
to account for what is happening within the chain in 
that context and the factors that influence the chain's 
performance (Bolwig et al. 2010). Infrastructure, policies, 
trade agreements, access to credit, and property rights 
are examples of external factors that could significantly 
impact a value chain’s performance and must be 
considered in value chain analysis (Stein and Barron 
2017). A schematic description of the MVC actors in 
Nigeria is presented in Figure 5.1.
The agricultural and food marketing system performs 
three sets of functions: exchange functions, physical 
functions, and facilitating functions. Exchange functions 
include buying, selling, and storage; while physical 
functions involve the assembly, transportation, sorting, 
processing, and standardisation of products; and 
facilitative functions involve financing, risk-bearing, and 
market intelligence (Olukosi, Isitor and Ode 2007). Each 
of these functions adds value to the product and requires 
inputs, which result in the marketers incurring costs, 
such as advertising and transportation costs (Olukosi, 
Isitor and Ode 2007; Kohls and Uhl 1990). Agricultural 
marketing connects farmers to the final consumers. It is 
the sum of all business and economic activities that direct 
the flow of food items and services from producers to 
consumers (Ugwumba 2009; Ebong 2007). Agricultural 
market actors ensure that farm products are available in 
the correct form, time, place, and at an affordable price 
to meet consumers’ demands (Olukosi, Isitor and Ode 
2007; Reddy et al. 2008). Middlemen assemble surplus 
farm produce from across the locality as it is scattered 
over farm settlements. These middlemen end up being 
the greatest beneficiaries because they dictate the 
commodity prices in the urban areas.
Nigeria’s maize market is influenced by a combination of 
growing domestic demand (for both human consumption 
and feed) and state intervention in foreign exchange, 
including a ban on maize imports between 2005 and 
2008 and bans on maize exports at different moments in 
time, such as in 2009 and 2010. Since 2015, the Buhari 
administration's mantra to produce what it consumes 
and consume what it produces has led to import bans 
on dozens of items, including the staple food, maize. In 
August 2019, Nigeria unexpectedly closed all its land 
borders with Niger, Cameroon, and Benin, to stop all 
movement of goods, except oil, for import or export. The 
Nigeria-Benin border closure was implemented without 
any formal communication with government officials of 
neighbouring countries. The closure is part of Nigeria's 
economic strategy to tackle the smuggling of goods 
across the border, increase local production, and protect 
local producers, as outlined in its 2017–2020 Economic 
Recovery Growth Plan. Smuggling activities across 
the Nigerian-Benin border account for yearly losses 
of about ₦110 billion (US$304 million) in trade revenue 
(Damilola 2020). Informal cross border trade flows of 
maize between Nigeria and its neighbouring countries 
are concentrated in the Kano–Katsina–Maradi regions 
at the border with Niger. This corridor is characterised 
by flows of both local products and exports from other 
countries. Niger imports significant volumes of cereals, 
including millet, maize, and sorghum, from Nigeria to 
mitigate its structural production deficit.
Although domestic production has increased, farmers 
still struggle to produce sufficient maize for Nigeria’s 
population of over 200 million people. The federal 
government has therefore promised to release 30,000t 
of maize from the national reserves to poultry farmers 
to deal with the high cost of poultry feed after the ban 
on maize imports. On 13 July 2020, the CBN directed 
all authorised dealers to discontinue the processing 
of Form M (a mandatory statutory document to be 
completed by all importers for the importation of 
goods into Nigeria) for the importation of maize, with 
immediate effect. The inconsistent circle of opening and 
closing the borders is an ostensible indication that some 
powerful governmental and non-governmental actors 
benefit from the system. These state actors operating 
in a cohort with powerful business tycoons connive to 
ensure the cycle continues.
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Like many other African countries that rely on the 
agricultural sector for food self-sufficiency and 
employment generation, Nigeria has been experiencing 
challenges since the World Health Organization 
declared the COVID-19 outbreak a global pandemic on 
28 February 2020. Following the federal government's 
shutdown directive and the restriction of movement 
across the country’s States, agricultural production, 
processing, and distribution has been affected. One 
such area adversely affected is the production and 
processing of maize (Table 5.1). Farmers across the 
MVC, especially those operating in the poultry feed 
segment, have been struggling to find maize to buy. 
Maize has been in scarce supply since the introduction 
of restrictions in response to the pandemic and prices 
have risen on a daily basis (Table 5.2). The scarcity 
of maize and the continuous rise in its cost has dire 
consequences for poultry farmers and all sectors 
linked directly or indirectly to the poultry value chain.
In February 2021, about 300,000t of maize was 
released into the Nigerian market from strategic 
anchors under the Anchor Borrowers’ Programme of 
the CBN, which is expected to reduce the current price 
of maize from ₦155,000 to ₦88,000 per t (Damilola 
2020). The release of this maize follows moves made 
by the CBN, working with the Nigeria Customs Service 
(NCS), in the last quarter of 2020, to facilitate import 
waivers to allow four agro-processing companies 
to import a total of 262,000t of maize to bridge the 
shortfall in local production. The release of 300,000t 
of maize is expected to cause the price of maize in the 
Nigerian market to drop significantly, thereby increasing 
demand for the crop and ultimately enhancing 
the gains of maize farmers. Before the CBN-NCS 
collaboration, in August 2020, President Muhammadu 
Buhari approved the release of 30,000t of maize from 
the National Strategic Grain Reserve to support the 
Poultry Association of Nigeria at a subsidised rate. The 
result was a momentary stability in the price of maize.
One of the reasons feed processors import maize 
is because it is cheaper from some countries, like 
America, where the government heavily subsidises 
the production of maize. By the time feed processors 
import American maize to Nigeria, it is still relatively 
cheaper than domestically produced maize, due to the 
higher production costs for Nigerian maize farmers. 
American maize is also cheaper because the value 
chain has a higher level of technology, which means 
productivity is higher and it therefore costs American 
farmers less to produce 1t of maize. While Nigeria’s 
maize yields peaked at 2.5t/ha, in America maize yields 
are 5.6t/ha, and even higher in some cases.
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Table 5.1: Changes in the amount of maize purchased before and after lockdown/COVID-19 
among selected MVC actors in Nigeria*










Fertiliser supplier Weekly 60 15 -75.0
Agrochemical supplier Weekly 1,500 500 -66.7
Processor Weekly 35 24 -31.4
Processor Weekly 20 5 -75.0
Processor Weekly 5 4 -20.0
Processor Weekly 50 40 -20.0
Wholesaler/retailer Weekly 10 4 -60.0
Wholesaler/retailer Weekly 3 1.5 -50.0
Wholesaler Weekly 6.5 3 -53.8
Wholesaler Weekly 10 5 -50.0
Wholesaler/retailer Weekly 2 1 -50.0
Average -50.2
Source: Authors’ field survey, 2020
*Before lockdown refers to quantities sourced before 31 March 2020, while after lockdown refers to quantities 
sourced after 1 April 2020.
Table 5.2: Changes in the prices of maize grain as a result of lockdown/COVID-19 among 
selected MVC actors in Nigeria
Value chain actor Frequency of 
supply
Price of maize 
before lockdown/
COVID-19 (₦/t)





Fertiliser supplier Weekly 5,000,000 2,500,000 -50.0
Agrochemical supplier Weekly 500,000 50,000 -90.0
Processor Weekly 80,000 110,000 37.5
Processor Weekly 80,000 110,000 37.5
Processor Weekly 80,000 110,000 37.5
Processor Weekly 90,000 150,000 66.7
Wholesaler/retailer Weekly 100,000 160,000 60.0
Wholesaler/retailer Weekly 90,000 115,000 27.8
Wholesaler Weekly 95,000 120,000 26.3
Wholesaler Weekly 90,000 100,000 11.1
Wholesaler/retailer Weekly 85,000 120,000 41.2
Average 38.4
Source: Authors’ field survey, 2020
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5.2 Different stages and processes in 
the chain
The MVC consists of many activities, namely: growing, 
processing, and marketing. Each of these steps in the 
chain have both upstream and downstream linkages. 
Upstream activities consist of the chain's supply side, 
and downstream activities are the marketing and 
distribution side of the chain. Seeds, fertilisers, labour, 
and farm technology are the essential upstream 
linkages at the farmer level. Meanwhile, post-harvest 
management, and the grading and marketing of raw 
maize are the upstream linkages. Value addition at 
the farmer level depends on input cost, output value, 
and the productivity of maize (Mutyasira 2019). The 
production and returns on investment at the farmer 
level depend on upstream and downstream activities, 
such as the scale of production and the level of 
technology, which helps to minimise production and 
processing costs. 
Another critical stage in the MVC is the processing of raw 
maize into different maize and maize derived products. 
Maize processing consists of primary, secondary, and 
tertiary processing. At the primary processing stage, 
maize is graded and packed for quality and variety. 
The market value of the raw maize is determined at this 
stage. Therefore, the potential to commercialise maize 
processing largely depends on the quality and quantity 
of maize grown by farmers. Both farmers and traders 
undertake primary processing. Poultry and animal 
feed manufacturers use primary processed maize. 
Secondary processing involves converting raw maize 
into different products and by-products that are used 
in tertiary processing for the manufacture of a variety of 
food and industrial products. Secondary processing is 
a vital activity in the MVC. Flours, flakes, and grits are 
products and by-products obtained from secondary 
processing sold in the consumer markets, bakeries, 
and food industries. Tertiary processing includes 
industries’ use of starch (obtained in wet-milling 
operations) for food, pharmaceuticals, paper, textiles, 
and adhesives. In the MVC, physical and market value 
is added in secondary processing, which helps in the 
effective utilisation of farmers’ maize surplus.
The MVC consists of strategic components and 
activities to move raw maize grain from growers through 
to the processors and the final customers (IFC 2019). 
At each stage of the chain, value is added. Traders 
and intermediaries are the links between each stage 
in the chain. The supply chain facilitates the smooth 
functioning of value delivery through the value chain, 
linking both upstream and downstream activities. The 
efficiency and effectiveness of all actors in the chain 
has an impact on both upstream and downstream 
activities. The value addition abilities of MVC actors are 
interdependent and critical in the effective utilisation of 
farmers' maize surplus. Both the primary and secondary 
processing stages support the farmers by offering a 
better price compared to unprocessed maize. These 
processing stages are essential for providing quality 
products for tertiary food processing units (including 
starch, oil high fructose, corn sweetener, ethanol, 
cereal and alkaline).
5.3 Challenges affecting 
the commercialisation and 
competitiveness of the MVC
The paramount technical constraints affecting the 
commercialisation of maize include access to inputs by 
farmers (improved seeds and fertiliser), access to credit 
by farmers and processors, and factors associated 
with climate change.
5.3.1 Access to inputs 
The lowering of input prices through subsidies 
provides incentives for farmers to use more inputs, 
which translates into increased output (Foresight, 2011) 
and higher farm profit (Liverpool-Tasie et al. 2017). 
Subsidised agricultural inputs may include improved 
seeds, fertilisers, crop protection chemicals, machinery, 
irrigation, and knowledge. However, Farmers’ access 
to inputs is negatively impacted by informal cross 
border trade and political influences on input subsidy 
policies, which limits the commercialisation of the MVC.
Studies undertaken by the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) highlight new 
patterns of informal cross border trade in the West 
Africa region, which are not only confined to border 
areas, but have extended to the whole national territory 
of countries (Sahel and West Africa Club/OECD 2006). 
Nigeria plays a significant role in this informal trade with 
flows of petrol, grain, and fertiliser, which penetrate 
the northern and western parts of Niger, being re-
exported to Mali, Burkina Faso, and Ghana (Senahoun 
2008). Informal exports to francophone countries are 
attributed to the informal exchange rate between the 
Naira and the CFA Franc, which cause Nigerian goods 
to be cheaper than those produced in francophone 
countries. The re-allocation and smuggling of 
subsidised fertilisers and other subsidised inputs from 
Nigeria can be a constraint for development initiatives 
seeking to increase agricultural productivity in Nigeria 
(Senahoun 2008). The significant volumes of maize and 
inputs traded informally between Niger and Nigeria 
imply the involvement of small and large traders, who 
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take indirect advantage of the non-tariff measures 
(like bribes) and roadblocks. However, these informal 
border measures result in low-profit margins for the 
smaller traders (Sahel and West Africa Club/OECD 
2006). This impacts Nigeria’s MVC by increasing the 
scarcity of maize and fertiliser.
Historically, SSA governments have intervened in 
agricultural markets to consolidate power among 
largely agrarian populations (Holmén 2005). Politically 
well-connected agents or communities have been 
known to receive more input subsidies or credit than 
less connected individuals (Mason, Jayne, and Van de 
Walle 2013; Chinsinga 2012; Holden and Lunduka 2012; 
Mpesi and Muriaas 2012; Banful 2011; Morris et al. 2007; 
Holmén 2005; Olayide and Idachaba 1987). Like many 
other SSA countries, Nigeria allocates a substantial 
portion of its agricultural budget to fertiliser subsidies 
(Liverpool-Tasie and Takeshima 2013; Mogues et al. 
2012a). The cost of fertiliser subsidy programmes 
between 2008 and 2010 was almost US$150 million 
per year: the second largest sum among major SSA 
countries with similar programmes (Jayne and Rashid 
2013). However, due to the influence of politically well-
connected individuals within the agricultural sector, 
subsidised fertiliser is often allocated sub-optimally 
from an efficiency perspective. In Nigeria, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that State governors patronise 
their districts of origin with preferential access to 
resources, including subsidised fertiliser. This means 
that sometimes rightful beneficiaries are excluded 
from fertiliser subsidy programmes because they do 
not support or belong to the political party in power 
(FMARD, 2016). The inconsistent allocation of such 
subsidy programmes has had a negative influence on 
farmers’ faith towards government programmes and 
may affect uptake of future innovations of this nature 
(Amurtiya et al. 2018).
Fertiliser subsidy policies in Nigeria have changed in 
volume, structure, and approach, reflecting power 
changes in government seats. The structure through 
which fertiliser subsidies are delivered creates room 
for government corruption (Grow Africa 2016). Under 
the present government regime in Nigeria, the aim is to 
build on the success of GES between 2011 and 2015 
(FMARD, 2016). The ATA's GES saw the emergence 
of input vouchers using mobile phone technology. 
However, under the Federal Market Stabilization 
Program (FMSP), implemented in Nigeria between 
1999 and 2012, federal and State governments 
physically distributed subsidised fertiliser. Under the 
FMSP, each State distributed subsidised fertiliser to 
farmers through various outlets, largely the Agricultural 
Development Project (ADP), a state-level public 
institution in charge of agricultural extension and other 
services, including input provision. No explicit targeting 
criteria or individual quota existed, and distribution 
was often ad hoc (Liverpool-Tasie and Takeshima 
2013). Another key distinction of the FMSP was that 
commercially distributed fertiliser existed in parallel to 
the subsidised fertiliser. Anecdotal evidence indicates 
that a substantial portion of subsidised fertiliser leaked 
into commercial markets and was sold as unsubsidised 
fertiliser. The quantities initially distributed as subsidised 
fertiliser often accounted for a significant share of 
total fertiliser consumption in the country (Liverpool-
Tasie and Takeshima 2013). However, the amount of 
subsidised fertiliser received by farmers accounted for 
only a relatively small fraction of the intended quantity, 
largely due to its diversion to profiteers.
5.3.2 The politics of fertiliser policy 
implementation
The politics behind the implementation of fertiliser 
policies in Nigeria remain an issue that needs better 
consideration. The participation of the state and 
private sectors jointly in the fertiliser market remains a 
topic of concern (Liverpool-Tasie and Tekshima 2013; 
Fuentes, Bumb, and Johnson 2012; IFDC 2001). Figure 
5.2 shows the flow of fertiliser in the market among 
stakeholders. On average, fertiliser subsidy policies 
tend to have a greater impact on total fertiliser use 
when administered in areas where the private sector 
has been inactive and when the policies target small 
scale farming households that cannot pay for fertiliser 
at market prices (Mather and Jayne 2015; Jayne and 
Rashid 2013; Ricker-Gilbert, Jayne and Chirwa 2011; 
Xu et al. 2009a,).
Considering the history of fertiliser policy in Nigeria, 
Nagy and Edun (2002) report that initially fertiliser 
policy existed solely in the States involved in the 
procurement and distribution of subsidised fertiliser. 
Nigeria only shifted to the centralised control of fertiliser 
procurement and distribution in the early 1980s. The 
implementation of the structural adjustment programme 
of the late 1980s led to private control of the ownership, 
procurement, and distribution of fertiliser in Nigeria 
in the 1990s. However, the private sector's failure to 
step up the supply to meet the demand for fertiliser 
in Nigeria resulted in the government reintroducing 
fertiliser subsidy and government participation in 
the country’s fertiliser market. Under the FMSP, the 
Nigerian government directly procured and distributed 
subsidised fertiliser via State governments and the 
private sector's role was minor (Liverpool-Tasie and 
Takeshima 2013; Liverpool-Tasie, Auchan, and Banful 
2010). In 2001, the government introduced a 35–41 
per cent subsidy for fertiliser, which later fell to 21–23 
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per cent, before it rose again to about 50 per cent 
under the GES between 2011–2015 (Amurtiya et al. 
2018; Ayoola and Ayoola 2016). In 2012, farmers paid 
₦5,500 for two bags of fertiliser and the federal and 
State governments paid the balance of 50 per cent 
to the agro-dealers. The 50 per cent subsidy was 
contributed in equal proportion by the federal and 
State governments.
The most recent policies and programmes that 
encapsulate fertiliser subsidies include the ATA and 
the APP. As explained in the previous section, the 
ATA (2011–2015) used the GES to implement the 
fertiliser subsidy policy using mobile phone vouchers. 
Introduced in 2016, the APP simply aims to build 
on the success of the ATA, using an agribusiness 
approach to boost the performance of the ATA 
scheme. However, the politics driving the changes in 
this policy structure are important because this goes a 
long way in determining the programme's success or 
failure. The roles and the political power play between 
fertiliser policy stakeholders – including the federal 
and State governments, international donors and 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the Ministry 
of Agriculture, relevant institutions, the ADP, and 
fertiliser companies and importers – requires better 
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understanding. Only by understanding these politics 
will government be able to conduct accurate scientific 
monitoring and evaluation to ensure the effective and 
efficient implementation of fertiliser policy.
The flow of fertiliser from State ministries, the private 
sector, and input supply companies to the ADP is 
worrisome and questionable. This is because, despite 
the numerous participants charged with fertiliser quality 
regulation, poor fertiliser quality remains a challenge 
in Nigeria. The quality challenges occur along the full 
spectrum of the fertiliser supply chain. Adulteration, 
which usually involves fertiliser being mixed with 
products like sand and crop or weed seeds, is a major 
problem. Other issues, like nutrient deficiency and 
underweight bags, have also been confirmed across 
the country (Ayoola, Chude and Abdulsalaam 2002). 
The fertilisers from each outlet are sold at different 
prices, which results in large scale and small scale 
farmers being exposed to fertiliser from different 
sources at different prices (Ayinde et al. 2019). This 
could result in farmers, especially small scale farmers, 
selling their subsidised fertiliser to agents at a higher 
price to obtain a short term profit instead of using 
the fertiliser on their fields to enhance productivity, as 
reported in the work of Liverpool-Tasie et al. (2015).
5.3.3. Access to credit 
Credit has been the focus of a good deal of research 
work in agricultural finance. Credit is an important 
instrument in the development of agriculture. As 
emphasised by many researchers, the smallholder 
already caught in the vicious cycle of poverty, requires 
not only labour and land, but an injection of capital to 
extricate them from the cycle. This argument favouring 
credit in agricultural development is not the same as 
assigning it a position of primus inter pares. When 
a farmer is granted a loan, many other things must 
go with it before the loan can become a productive 
instrument. Apart from the fact that natural forces 
constrain agriculture, farmers' attitude concerning loan 
use is also an important factor. 
Funds for agricultural finance are met through macro 
and microfinance mechanisms. The macrofinance 
aspect pertains to financing agriculture through 
government capital allocation to agriculture. It 
also includes mobilising resources for agricultural 
development using institutional credit agencies like 
the CBN and the Nigerian Agricultural, Cooperative, 
and Rural Development Bank, as well as rural banking 
development programmes. On the other hand, the 
microfinance aspect of agriculture pertains to the 
individual farm, in particular, the financing of farm 
management, which relies on the acquisition and use 
of capital in the farm business using commercial banks.
The federal government of Nigeria, being desperate 
to transform the nation's agriculture sector, has, since 
the early 1970s, embarked on substantial capital 
investment programmes in agriculture. These initiatives 
have been driven by the belief that credit is the all-
encompassing productive input required by farmers to 
transform their productive capacity.
Federal government funded financing and risk 
management strategies to support the development of 
the agricultural sector include the Anchor Borrowers' 
Programme, CACS, and the establishment of 
NIRSAL. The CBN’s Anchor Borrowers’ Programme, 
introduced in 2015, conceptually works like contract 
farming, which has been found to be effective in other 
developing countries like India (Bommanahalli and 
Rangappa, 2016). Available information from the CBN 
(2016) indicates that so far, under the Programme, the 
federal government has spent ₦23 billion in promoting 
the local production of rice, soya bean, sugar and 
other important agricultural produce. The CACS was 
established for promoting commercial agricultural 
enterprises in Nigeria, which is a sub-component of 
the federal government’s Commercial Agriculture 
Development Programme. The total amount released 
by the CBN to farmers under the CACS, since inception, 
stood at ₦635.39 billion at the end of the first quarter of 
2020. In all, a total of 608 projects have benefitted from 
the CACS (CBN, 2020).
In line with its mandate, from its inception in 2011, 
NIRSAL had facilitated the investment of over ₦100 
billion from banks and other parts of the financial sector 
into the agricultural sector by 2019. This was achieved 
by catalysing funding into various value chains from the 
private sector through deposit money banks, the capital 
market, other categories of financial institutions, vendor 
financiers and other value chain actors. Several State 
governments have also deployed funding strategies to 
unlock growth in their most advantageous agricultural 
products. All these initiatives are designed to deepen 
the credit market for agribusiness. For instance, 
according to CBN, about 74 per cent of the ₦200 
billion special credit intervention fund under CACS was 
disbursed to 191 businesses between 2009 and 2016. 
Forty-five per cent of the beneficiaries of this fund were 
involved in crop production, 23 per cent in livestock 
production and 15 per cent in agricultural processing. 
In terms of beneficiaries’ location, the States with the 
highest number of recipients were Oyo, Kano, Kaduna, 
Lagos, Edo, and Kwara.
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5.3.4 Climate change and its implications
Climate change is a serious environmental threat to 
food security, and it worsens poverty due to its impact 
on agricultural productivity. Almost all agriculture 
sectors depend on the weather and climate, the 
increasing variability of which has meant farmers 
who depend on agriculture for their livelihoods may 
encounter total failure due to the effects of climate 
change (Ozor et al. 2010). Local climate variability 
can influence people's decisions, with consequences 
for their social, economic, political, and personal 
conditions, and can affect their lives and livelihood 
(Newsham et al. 2018). There is a growing consensus 
in the scientific literature that over the coming decades, 
higher temperature and changing precipitation levels 
caused by climate change would be unfavourable for 
crop growth and yield in many regions and countries, 
including Nigeria (Yesuf et al. 2008).
The increasing demand for maize and its global 
advance implies that by 2023, maize will account for 
the greatest share (34 per cent) of the total crop area 
harvested globally (OECD/FAO 2014). This estimate 
poses challenges to the global capacity to sustainably 
supply the volumes of maize needed – particularly 
in low- and middle-income countries. Indeed, rising 
demand has often driven the expansion of maize 
farmland in these countries and brought new land 
into cultivation instead of encouraging sustainable 
intensification to increase the yields of existing maize 
farms. Most of the crop production in Nigeria involves 
a low level of technology and is therefore heavily 
susceptible to environmental factors and climate 
change, which cause problems for farmers (Obioha 
2008). The challenges facing farmers due to climate 
change include widespread crop failure, reduced 
agricultural productivity, increased hunger and 
malnutrition, and more frequent disease outbreaks 
(Zoellick 2009). These problems hamper agricultural 
output and the contribution of the agricultural sector 
to Nigeria's GDP. The number of malnourished 
children in SSA is expected to increase as the severity 
of climate change increases. Climate change models 
have suggested that average maize yields are likely to 
fall by between 5 per cent and 33 per cent by 2050, 
depending on the severity of climate change (Nelson 
et al. 2010), with the most substantial decrease in 
productivity occurring in the least developed countries 
(Ignaciuk and Mason-D'Croz 2014). At the same time, 
maize prices could increase by 30 per cent as supply 
1 Rentier capitalism is a term used to describe the belief in economic practices that facilitate the monopolisation 
of access to any kind of property (physical, financial, intellectual, etc.) and the gaining of significant profits without 
contributing to society. APRA
dwindles due to climate change (Ignaciuk and Mason-
D'Croz 2014).
The situation of global warming is not helped by 
the governments in Africa. Nigeria, for example, 
is a mono-cultural economy in which all attempts 
at diversification are hindered by the indigenous 
capitalist class, whose sustenance is dependent on 
such means of production. This economic structure 
does not help the poor who are dependent on a few 
agricultural products. Nigerians find it cheaper to 
import maize in large quantities rather than produce 
it locally, probably due to the low level of mechanised 
farming, which hinders productivity and farmers’ 
ability to satisfy and feed the population (Onyishi 
2011). The Nigerian economy is sustained by a rentier 
system in which crude exploration of oil resources is 
the basis for revenue generation.1  Marxian literature 
(Onyishi 2011) does not esteem Nigeria's economic 
setting as productive, since the creative energy (the 
science behind the production) is wielded by foreign 
expertise. The Nigerians only control and do not even 
own the production tools of their oil industry (Ashley 
2011). Nigeria can be said to be entirely dependent 
on developed economies and only have control over 
the means of production of agricultural crops (Onyishi 
2011). This already fragile economic structure, means 
that Nigeria is highly sensitive to agricultural challenges 
caused by climate change.
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Building on the regional momentum of NEPAD (2001) 
and CAADP (2003), the overall thrust of Nigerian policy 
decisions and measures is to increase food production 
and commercialisation and develop the agribusiness 
sector, including the MVC. The reasons for low 
productivity in Nigeria include poor infrastructure, 
which plagues processing and marketing activities; 
limited farm inputs; low investment; and unfavourable 
government policies. Several initiatives have been 
launched by the national government to address these 
challenges. However, they have not achieved self-
sufficiency in maize production as desired.
6.1 Major changes in policy
Nigeria has focused on four major policies or policy 
areas that are relevant to the MVC over the past 12 
years: (1) the National Policy on Food Security (NPFS), 
(2) agricultural inputs policy, (3) improving access to 
quality seeds, and (4) agro-processing/value addition.
6.1.1 The National Policy on Food Security (2008–
2011)
The NPFS was launched in 2008 and focused 
on enhancing crop value chains to increase food 
production (Amaza 2019). The NPFS' main objective 
was to ensure that all Nigerians attain food security. 
Hence, the policy sought to explicitly facilitate 
access to high quality, locally produced food and 
transform Nigeria from a food importer to a net food 
exporter. An integral component of the NPFS was the 
establishment of the National Fadama Development 
Project (NFDP) to guarantee the growing of crops all 
year round and boost agricultural production through 
irrigation. The NFDP promoted simple, improved, and 
cost-effective irrigation methods with support from the 
World Bank and taking advantage of the various water 
bodies' economic potential under the River Basin 
Development Authority.
The principal beneficiaries of the NPFS were 
smallholder farmers, especially under the NFDP. For 
instance, in North East Nigeria, 32 per cent of farmers 
benefitted from increased access to agricultural 
advisory services, an increase in crop yields by 47 per 
cent, and an increase in household incomes by 40 per 
cent (Nkonya et al. 2019).
A main component of the NPFS and NFDP was the 
FADAMA III Project, established in 2008. The Project 
had a significant impact on the yields of maize and rice, 
but not on the yields of sorghum or millet (Nkonya et 
al. 2019). Maize yields increased by 20 per cent and 
production increased by 24,000t per annum – illustrating 
the successful promotion of higher crop productivity, 
which contributed to increasing food security (Nkonya 
et al. 2017). The increase in yields of maize and rice 
was due to the adoption of improved varieties and the 
increased use of fertiliser. The Project data revealed 
that, on average, household income among FADAMA II 
beneficiaries increased by 53 per cent – well above the 
Project's target of increasing revenues by 40 per cent 
for 70 per cent of the beneficiaries. 
The NPFS made modest progress in increasing 
agricultural production, as maize yields increased by 20 
per cent, rice by 40 per cent, and cocoa by 15 per cent 
between the years 2007 and 2010 (FAOSTAT, 2019). 
Despite the progress in aggregate production, food 
security remains a challenge in Nigeria, the proportion 
of the total population who were undernourished 
increased marginally from 6 to 6.2 per cent between 
2007 and 2010.
6.1.2 Agricultural inputs policy (fertiliser) 
The limited availability of inputs has impacted Nigeria's 
agricultural production over the years. Local farmers 
have lacked the required seeds, fertilisers, and water for 
production activities. The ATA focused on addressing 
this input challenge, resulting in policies that facilitated 
the supply of subsidised seeds and fertilisers to 18 per 
cent of farmers in Nigeria (estimated at 12–14 million 
individuals) between 2011 and 2014 (FMARD 2014). 
However, the fertiliser sub-sector in Nigeria remains 
one of the most controversial of the input sectors. It 
is fraught with corruption and mismanagement, arising 
from government subsidies and the procurement, 
marketing, and distribution processes (World Bank 
2014). For instance, before the ATA was launched in 
2011, despite the billions of Naira spent by successive 
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governments over the previous four decades, only 11 per 
cent of smallholder farmers had accessed subsidised 
fertiliser (FMARD 2014). The level of corruption in the 
system was huge due to the government’s direct 
procurement and distribution of fertilisers. The system 
disempowered smallholder farmers, since the political 
elites' power as the broker enabled them to siphon off 
fertiliser meant for smallholder farmers. 
One of the ATA's strategies was to increase smallholder 
farmers’ access to fertiliser subsidies. Hence, the 
Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 
(FMARD) allocated a significant share of its budget 
to fertiliser subsidies (Liverpool-Tasie and Takeshima 
2013; Mogues et al. 2012a). To help reduce corruption, 
the ATA supported the acquisition of fertiliser and seeds 
through e-vouchers for farmers involved in the maize 
and rice value chains. Under the ATA, the government 
took steps to address technology gaps by introducing 
the GES in 2011. Among other measures, the scheme 
encouraged the private sector to commercialise the 
distribution of fertiliser and seed production, moving 
away from a flat fertiliser price subsidy toward targeted 
support to smallholder farmers (AGRA 2019a). The 
policy positively impacted maize production in Nigeria, 
as total maize production increased by 19 per cent, 
from 8.88 million t in 2011 to 10.56 million t in 2015 
(Amaza 2019).
6.1.3 Improved access to quality seeds
Reforms in the seed sector started in 2002, when 
the federal government of Nigeria constituted a 
panel of experts to review the National Seed Decree 
of 1992 (World Bank 2014). The liberalisation of the 
production, marketing, and distribution of basic seed 
by the private sector since 1992 and the adoption of 
the ATA in 2011 has led to changes in the demand for 
and supply of improved seeds. Table 6.1 presents the 
trends in the domestic production of certified maize 
seed in Nigeria. There has been remarkable growth 
in the quantity of improved maize seed produced in 
the country. Production of hybrid maize seed and 
OPV seed grew by 167 per cent and 1,235 per cent, 
respectively, over the period 2007–2017. This growth 
in production of improved seeds is attributed mainly 
to the ATA seed policy. The ATA stopped the direct 
procurement of improved seeds by government 
officials, which was associated with corruption 
and rent-seeking. This led to the liberalisation of 
foundation seed production, facilitating the growth of 
private sector seed producers and seed companies. 
Data from the National Agricultural Seed Council 
(NASC) (2015) showed that the quantity of foundation 
seed produced increased by 406 per cent from 593t 
in 2011 to 3,001t in 2015. The quantity of foundation 
seed produced by National Agricultural Research 
Institutes also increased remarkably by 1,761 per 
cent within the same period. This increase in the 
production of foundation and certified seeds has 
increased access to improved seeds by farmers.
The seed industry's ATA policy reforms led to a 
growth in the number of seed companies involved in 
seed production from less than 20 in 2009 to 116 in 
2015 (NASC 2015). The reforms promoted the private 
sector's leading role in Nigeria's seed industry. The 
rate of increase in certified seeds was highest for 
maize compared to any other crop, which facilitated 
an increase in the output of maize grain by 42 per 
cent between 2010/2011 and 2014/2015 (Table 4.1). 
A recent study conducted by the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) (2018) 
also revealed that farmers in Nigeria had experienced 
productivity increases in crop production between 
2012 and 2016. The productivity increases were 
highest for maize farmers, who experienced a 216 
per cent increase in productivity, from an average 
yield of 1.36t/ha to an average yield of 4.3t/ha, as a 
result of the MARKETS II intervention.
The increases in production due to improved seeds 
have implications for farmers' food security and 
Table 6.1: Trends in certified maize seed production by type and year
Crop 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Maize 
hybrid (t)
1,137 2,641 3,150 1,607 1,947 3,335 4,639 2,936 3,143 3,470 3,033
Maize
OPV (t)




3,323 7,208 4,931 3,410 5,313 14,251 58,128 74,081 47,812 37,640 32,207
Source: NASC, 2017
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welfare. Food security is a crucial indicator of household 
wellbeing and includes food sources from household 
production and cash purchases. The expectation is that 
increases in yields would increase farm households' 
food availability and income as they sell their surplus 
produce. Due to the link between food insecurity and 
poverty (Amaza, Bila, and Iheanacho 2006), increased 
availability of improved seed is also likely to reduce 
farmers’ poverty level and improve their welfare
6.1.4 Maize value addition (processing)
Under the ATA policy, the government promoted maize 
value addition and interacted with major maize and 
soybean processors, like Nestlé, Guinness, Animal 
Care, Hybrid Feeds, and Grand Cereals, to gauge 
their requirements. Each State in Nigeria formed six 
production clusters to aid access to input and output 
markets and devised innovation platforms (IPs) to 
engage actors in the value chain (FMARD 2015). The 
IPs fostered linkages amongst actors in the value 
chain, especially between the public sector (ADP) 
and private sector participants (farmers, marketers, 
and the industrial processors) under a public-private 
partnership arrangement. 
Findings from KIIs with maize processors suggest 
that public-private partnerships between farmers and 
processors, combined with MARKETS II, facilitated 
capacity building and contributed to positive changes 
in both the quantity and quality of processed products. 
For example, in Kaduna State, one of the participating 
processors, Feedtek Limited, said that the partnership 
with Kaduna ADP increased their visibility and exposed 
them to farmer groups. The partnership also raised 
awareness of the best farming technologies and 
good practices among farmer groups, contributing to 
increased supplies of maize grains by the farmer groups 
to the processors (USAID 2018). The partnership 
facilitated farmers' access to output markets by linking 
beneficiary farmer groups to maize processors, who 
bought harvested maize from the farmers for processing. 
The arrangement saved farmers time in searching for 
markets, helped them to obtain premium prices for their 
maize, and, in some cases, enhanced their ability to 
access cash or credit in-kind from the off-takers.
6.2 Current policies and regulations 
that govern participation in the MVC
 
Current policy guides and regulations that govern 
participation in the MVC include (1) the National 
Fertilizer Quality Control Act (2019) and (2) the National 
Agricultural Seed Act (2019). 
6.2.1 The National Fertilizer Quality Control Act 
(2019)
The National Fertilizer Quality Control Act was signed 
into law on 16 October 2019, after 17 years of political 
process and advocacy from the national government, 
NGOs, and business entities with different interests in 
the fertiliser sub-sector (AGRA 2019a). The protracted 
legislative process hinged on the economic interests 
of the political elites, who benefitted from the hitherto 
status quo for fertiliser policy. This has harmed the 
MVC, as smallholder farmers, who constitute over 
90 per cent of maize producers, had limited access 
to fertiliser and were forced to purchase poor quality 
fertiliser at exorbitant prices. 
The Act is significant because it provides a legal 
foundation for setting up a competitive fertiliser 
industry that can supply farmers with quality products 
at affordable prices. Additionally, the law is particularly 
useful in reducing adulterated fertilisers, as there 
is a stiff penalty for violators of the Act. It therefore 
protects farmers and everyone in the fertiliser supply 
chain, including fertiliser manufacturers, blenders, 
distributors, and agro-dealers, among others, from 
inadvertently purchasing poor quality fertiliser.
6.2.2 The National Agricultural Seed Act (2019) 
The National Agricultural Seed Act (2019) was an 
improvement of the NASC Act of 2005. The Act exists 
for the following reasons: (1) to promote and stimulate 
the development of a dependable seed industry; (2) to 
regulate and control the registration of released seed 
varieties; (3) to protect farmers from sales of poor-quality 
seeds; (4) to facilitate the production and marketing of 
high-quality seeds; and (5) to provide legal backing 
for official certification, sales, importation, exportation 
and use of seeds (NASC 2019). The Act also promotes 
increased private sector participation in the seed sector, 
in line with current agricultural seed policy towards 
globalisation and export trade promotion. 
The National Agricultural Seed Act was an outcome of 
consultations with stakeholders in Nigeria's seed value 
chain, a crucial component of the policy and regulatory 
reform procedure (AGRA 2017). Accordingly, the 
Nigerian Agribusiness Group (NABG), with the support 
of the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), 
facilitated stakeholder consultation workshops in 
Abuja on 9 February 2017. Essentially, the consultative 
workshops sought to provide an opportunity for 
stakeholders to contribute to the provisions of the 
seed Bill being processed for enactment into law. The 
workshop participants included vital stakeholders from 
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the government, including the FMARD, NASC, NABG, 
the Seed Producers’ and Distributors’ Association of 
Nigeria (SEDAN), the Fertilizer Producers’ and Sellers’ 
Association of Nigeria (FEPSAN), AGRA, agri-dealers, 
farmers' groups, academics, legal consultants, and 
the IITA. The validated seed policy document was 
subsequently presented to the National Assembly in a 
seed Bill. There was a public hearing on the Bill, which 
passed after the first, second, and third hearings, and 
through the National Assembly. Finally, the Nigerian 
President accented to the Seed Act in November 2019.
The National Agricultural Seed Act is the most 
satisfactory policy from the perspective of seed 
producers, who play a leading role in the multiplication, 
marketing, and distribution of seeds. The Seed Act 
provides the private sector with incentives – in the form 
of intellectual property rights over improved varieties 
and an export market for seeds in the Economic 
Community of West African States – to supply enough 
quality seed to farmers at affordable prices. Under 
the Bill’s regulations, the government performs a 
regulatory role in the seed industry, consequently 
minimising the sale of adulterated or fake seed in 
the seed sector. There is a stiff penalty for those 
who engage in marketing fake or adulterated seeds. 
Finally, an ex-ante impact assessment of the regulatory 
seed Bill has shown that the recently approved Seed 
Act (2019) will have positive effects on Nigeria's 
economy (AGRA 2017). Major stakeholders in Nigeria's 
seed value chain, including the government, seed 
producers/companies, and smallholder farmers, all 
stand to gain from the implementation of the reformed 
seed Bill. This evidence is derived from the positive 
net benefits revealed by a benefit/cost ratio of 2.28 for 
government, 3.57 for seed producers/companies, and 
1.45 for smallholder farmers over five years. The higher 
net positive benefit ratio of 3.57 for seed producers 
suggests they are the greatest beneficiaries from the 
implementation of the Seed Act (2019).
6.3 The actors influencing policy 
decisions within the MVC
Both state and non-state actors influence policy within 
the MVC, in both formal and non-formal channels, 
depending on where their interests lie. These actors 
include private sector seed companies, development 
partners, political elites, wholesale dealers, farmers' 
groups, NGOs, and farmers' associations. The primary 
value chain activities influenced by policy decisions are 
(1) input supply, (2) seed production and distribution, 
and (3) maize distribution and sales. The focus on these 
value chain activities hinges on the political power of 
the actors involved in each stage in influencing policy 
reforms in the MVC. 
6.3.1 Input supply
The actors that influence the supply and distribution 
of agricultural inputs are the FEPSAN, development 
partners (such as AGRA), agro-dealers, and state 
actors. In the formal sector, FEPSAN, AGRA, agro-
dealers and NABG have been at the forefront in 
influencing the recently passed National Fertilizer 
Quality Control Bill (2019). Together these actors 
organised stakeholder advocacy activities to push 
for the passage of the Bill, which is targeted towards 
regulating the production and sale of fertiliser in Nigeria 
(AGRA, 2019b). AGRA also funded efforts to promote 
the passage of the Bill under the Micro Reforms for 
Africa Agribusiness programme. 
The main interest of the initiators of the National 
Fertilizer Quality Control Bill was to facilitate farmers’ 
access to quality fertiliser and enhance the business of 
fertiliser production, marketing, and distribution in the 
formal market. However, KIIs with commercial farmers 
established that the significant fertiliser importers, 
such as political elites, also influence fertiliser supply 
and distribution.
6.3.2 Agricultural seed
In the formal seed sub-sector, the major value chain 
actors that influence changes in policy are the private 
sector seed producers, through SEDAN, NABG, and 
AGRA. KIIs with Da All-Green Seeds reveals that the 
private sector seed producers represented by SEDAN, 
NABG and AGRA played a dominant role in ensuring 
the national government's approval of the revised seed 
Bill in 2019. The private sector's interest was to ensure 
the embedding of quality control and efficiency in the 
production, distribution, and marketing of seeds in 
Nigeria, which would help overcome the sale of fake or 
adulterated seeds that act as a disincentive to genuine 
seed producers. Thus, the current 2019 Seed Act is 
envisaged to promote competition and transparency in 
seed production and marketing. For the development 
partners, their interest was to ensure a seed industry 
driven by the private sector, which would promote 
competitiveness nationally and internationally and 
increase maize productivity in the long run.
6.3.3 Maize marketing
The Maize Wholesalers' Association and the Maize 
Farmers' Association have remarkably influenced 
the policy that deals with formal trading in maize 
grain. KIIs with wholesalers indicate that most of the 
Associations’ elected leaders are individuals who have 
political influence, hence, they easily influence policy 
36 Working Paper 060 | July 2021
changes in farmers’ favour, especially large farmers. 
For instance, the closure of Nigeria's land borders in 
2019 was influenced mainly by these associations. The 
farmers' interest in border closures was to earn higher 
domestic production prices, which hitherto were low 
due to illegal imports from neighbouring countries. The 
illegal imports through informal channels, though, are 
also mainly influenced by wholesalers.
6.4 Social differences within the MVC 
This section examines social differences within the 
MVC. The social differences are analysed according to 
gender, age and experience, educational level, marital 
status, household size, and wealth group, among other 
factors. Social differences, especially at the household 
level, affect commercialisation of the MVC.
6.4.1 Gender
Gender norms still affect women, especially in the main 
maize producing areas in Nigeria, which has implications 
for their physical mobility, decision making, economic 
participation, resource access and control, and 
access to information, networks, extension services, 
and development opportunities. In most communities, 
reputational risks limit women's movement beyond 
their homesteads and villages and they are most often 
discouraged from taking risks (Silong 2017). As such, 
women often operate on a small scale as producers 
and traders. Research findings by Maize Gennovate 
(2017) indicate women express concern for how taking 
risks with their businesses may jeopardise household 
food security and invite scorn, ostracism, or violence.
Research findings from Ater, Aye and Daniel (2018), 
Osundu et al. (2014), and Ogunniyi and Omoteso 
(2011), report that most of the stakeholders in the MVC 
in Nigeria are men. While most of the men are involved 
in the production and marketing of maize, most of 
the women are engaged in post-harvest handling 
and processing activities. Findings by Ogunniyi and 
Omoteso (2011) also confirm higher productivity among 
male managed farms, which report better access to 
productive farm resources and services than female 
managed farms. This gender difference is interpreted 
as partly due to men finding it more convenient to 
participate in most training activities than females – 
largely because they have less limits on their mobility – 
which enables their effective use of modern agricultural 
inputs. This gender differentiation is mainly influenced 
by religious affiliations and sociocultural orientations 
especially in northern Nigeria. However, some female 
farmers/managers, especially those who are literate or 
have some form of education, have access to improved 
technologies and extension services. Most of the 
time, illiterate or uneducated women rely on men 
for seed purchases, technology access, extensive 
machine use, hiring labour, and implementing new 
land management practices. Hence, their use of 
improved technologies and ownership of farmland, 
machinery, and tools remains low (Maize Gennovate 
2017; Silong 2018).
6.4.2 Age and experience
Age and experience influence farmers’ adoption 
of maize technologies, maize productivity, and the 
extent of commercialisation. Findings from studies 
of the MVC in northern Nigeria (Sennuga, Fadiji and 
Thaddeus 2020; Ater, Aye and Daniel 2018; Amaza et 
al. 2014), report that age, in correlation with farming 
experience, had a significant influence on the decision 
making process concerning risk aversion, adoption of 
improved technologies, and other production related 
decisions. The research identifies that older farmers, 
with more years of farming experience, have greater 
influence in decision making, including when to plant 
and apply fertiliser to maize crop. Furthermore, age 
was found to have a direct bearing on the availability 
and mobility of farm manpower, the ease with which 
improved practices are adopted, and the size of 
the farm area cultivated by the farmer at any given 
time. Younger farmers were generally found to be 
more mobile and more receptive to new ideas and 
technologies compared to older farmers. Similarly, in 
southern Nigeria, Olalekan and Bamire (2015) reported 
that both age and farming experience were significant 
determinants of adoption of improved maize varieties. 
They identified the dominance of older farmers in 
the study areas, which has adverse implications for 
maize commercialisation, since maize is essentially 
labour-intensive and older farmers have a more limited 
capacity to carry out manual labour. For instance, the 
mean age of farmers was 43 years in Kano State and 
41 years in Bauchi State (Amaza et al. 2014).
6.4.3 Educational attainment
The political dynamics of the MVC, especially the 
dynamics of small and medium sized enterprises 
(SMEs), is affected by education. The average urban 
northern trader is a substantial SME managed by an 
educated man. For instance, in the 2015–16 season, 
SMEs managed by educated men sold 300t and 435t 
of maize in the low and high seasons, respectively 
(Liverpool-Tasie et al. 2017). 
Education enables farmers to acquire and use relevant 
information and utilise resources more effectively 
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and efficiently. The positive influence of education on 
farmers' production efficiency has been confirmed 
by many scholars (Silong 2017; Amaza 2016; 
Schreinemachers et al. 2016; Anigbogu, Agbasi, and 
Okoli 2015; Ibitoye and Onimisi 2013). These findings 
report that farmers with 7–12 years of formal education 
are more likely to be efficient in their productive activities 
than those without a formal education. Scholarly 
reports also indicate that male farmers are often more 
efficient and productive than female farmers because 
they often have more years of formal education.
6.4.4 Marital status
Scholarly findings, such as Amaza (2016), report 
increases in maize productivity for farmers living with 
their spouses compared to farmers without spouses. 
The findings highlight the benefits derived from male 
and female farmers' complementary roles in maize 
production and value addition. Conversely, Ayoola et 
al. (2011) found that the effect of the marital status of 
women on rice productivity was negative. This research 
implied that women are more likely to be constrained 
in marriage, given their multiple domestic roles and the 
cultural practices of keeping married women in purdah, 
which prevents them from direct field production 
activities. Married men often manage and control the 
majority of agricultural production and transactions 
for their households or families. Depending on their 
agency, single and married women may manage farm 
holdings. Women whose husbands have moved into 
waged labour in cities also perform diverse non-farm 
activities and provide significant input into technology 
adoption negotiations (CGIAR Consortium Office 2015).
6.4.5 Household size
Household size can sometimes be an asset to actors 
in the agricultural value chain, in terms of available 
workforce/labour, all things being equal. However, 
often actors with large households are faced with the 
challenges of providing social and welfare facilities, like 
food, education, shelter, health care, and other living 
expenses for many dependants, which account for 
their low savings. Additionally, household members 
tend to consume most farm produce, leaving little 
surplus to sell for income (Achem et al. 2013).
6.4.6 Access to credit
The use of credit facilities has been advocated by Ojiako 
and Ogbukwe (2012) to support production because it 
plays an enviable role in economic transformation and 
rural development. Defined as the process of having 
control over the use of others' money, goods, and 
services in the present, in exchange for a promise to 
repay the debt at a future date (Adegeye and Dittoh 
1985), credit has the potential to increase farmers' 
productivity, enhance food security and household 
income, and augment the borrower's capacity to 
repay credit (Ojiako and Ogbukwa 2012). Hence, credit 
is a crucial input for the efficiency of smallholders' 
operations and business expansion. The limitations 
of self-financing farming activity; the uncertainties 
associated with the levels of output; and the time lag 
between input acquisition, use and output realisation in 
agriculture justify the request for and use of farm credit 
(Kohansal and Mansoori 2009). Whether received in 
cash or input-credit, credit empowers smallholders to 
make timely purchases, use improved seeds, apply 
fertiliser and herbicides, and pay for labour services. 
However, many reports from Nigeria indicate poor 
access to credit by stakeholders involved in the 
agricultural sector and MVC (Silong and Gadanakis 
2019; Oladejo and Adetunji 2012; Amaza, Ayuba, and 
Alpha 2008; Amaza, Bila, and Iheanacho 2006).
Generally, smallholder farmers have less chance 
of accessing credit than commercial farmers. This 
disadvantage is further exacerbated for women 
farmers, who have a lower chance of accessing 
credit than men. The social differentiation with 
regards to access to credit may largely be associated 
with collateral ownership. Commercial farmers and 
men tend to have more collateral to enable them to 
access credit than smallholder farmers and women, 
respectively. Women’s lack of property ownership 
rights act as a major barrier to them gaining collateral. 
It has been reported by Ater, Aye and Daniel (2018) that 
the majority of the stakeholders involved in the MVC 
in Nigeria are in the low to medium income group. 
Most of these stakeholders are smallholder farmers, 
wholesalers, and retail maize traders. They tend to 
operate on a small scale, which affects their incomes. 
Due to their low level of income and lack of collateral 
to access credit, these stakeholders do not have the 
required resources to invest in value addition and 
increase the scale of their operations (Schreinemachers 
et al. 2016; Anigbogu, Agbasi, and Okoli 2015).
6.4.7 Access to storage facilities
Storage facilities are essential for storing grain until 
such a time that it is disposed of or sold out. However, 
storage facilities are lacking in Nigeria, which has a 
negative implication on maize production. A large 
quantity of maize is at the mercy of fungal infestation 
and moth destruction. KIIs with some farmers 
indicated that insufficient storage facilities limited their 
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production capacity. Men often have better access 
to large scale storage facilities, including stores that 
are usually rented or hired out in the marketplace of 
communities, than women who often store maize in 
small lots using bags. Additionally, commercial farmers 
are more likely to have their own storage facilities 
compared to smallholder farmers, which puts them at 
a further advantage compared to smallholders.
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This paper is an attempt at unpacking the political 
economy of the MVC in Nigeria. It has shown how 
the political dimension of the MVC in Nigeria revolves 
around input supply, especially fertiliser; trading in 
maize, especially importations; sales to processing 
industries; and social differentiation by gender and farm 
size (commercial versus smallholder farmers). These 
dimensions tend to have implications for stakeholders 
in the value chain, especially smallholder producers, 
wholesalers, and retailers engaged in domestic trade. 
The paper has addressed three main questions. The 
first focused on the key actors and interests: who 
participates and how do they benefit? We have seen 
that that the political interest in the MVC is largely 
focused on the fertiliser inputs required in maize 
production, as different actors tend to benefit from 
the diversion of government subsidised fertiliser for 
their own gain. These include the political elites, policy 
makers, industrial processors, and traders. Notably, 
the political elite’s interest in the MVC is mainly focused 
on the fertiliser inputs required in maize production, 
where they tend to benefit from the diversion of 
subsidised fertiliser from the government. Private 
sector processing industries and traders prefer to 
import maize because they profit from the relatively 
lower prices compared to domestically produced 
maize. Most smallholder farmers fail to benefit from 
government efforts and policies due to their poor 
implementation and targeting, as seen in regards to 
fertiliser policies.
A second aspect is the rules and policies: who 
makes the rules, and who wins and loses? As has 
been demonstrated in this paper, changes in political 
regimes and associated policies present a challenge 
to dealers’ and farmers’ access to fertiliser and 
inputs. The government’s constant effort to boost 
and improve smallholder farmers’ productivity through 
policies intended to aid adoption and increase fertiliser 
use is yet to translate into an increase in sustainable 
agricultural production, rural household income, and 
livelihood. Most smallholder farmers fail to benefit 
from these government efforts and policies due to 
their poor implementation and targeting, as observed 
in the government’s fertiliser policy. Smallholder 
farmers find it particularly difficult to engage in 
meaningful commercial production of maize, despite 
attempts by successive governments to propagate 
supportive policy environments for this to happen. 
The commercialisation of the MVC could serve as 
an incentive for agricultural households to increase 
their present level of maize supply to bridge the gap 
between production and consumption.
And third, what are the implications across different 
social groups? The paper has shown that the 
social barriers to participation in the MVC in Nigeria 
are significant, with wide reaching effects for 
commercialisation. As a commercial or cash crop, 
maize’s production and sale for commercial purposes 
is dominated by men. Women farmers often view 
maize production as a productive, income-generating 
activity, yet refrain from growing maize because they 
lack the capital to purchase the required inputs, like 
fertiliser, or hire someone to plough the fields. Instead, 
they cultivate maize on a limited scale and continue 
growing other crops like cowpea, groundnuts, cassava, 
and yams, which require fewer fertiliser inputs. In some 
instances, especially among spouses, men take over 
control of women’s maize crop as it is commercialised. 
As a result, women who grow maize, mainly do so 
for household food security. Women are unable to 
increase their production of maize because of the 
many challenges related to non-ownership of land, 
lack of credit and inability to penetrate market cartels. 
These challenges also limit the quantity of maize 
available in markets in Nigeria. Like women, youth 
are not only faced with lack of the required collaterals 
to access loans for MVC, but also with challenges of 
non-ownership of farmland. Since this segment of the 
society is the largest in numerical terms, their capacity 
to take advantage of the opportunities in the MVC is 
impaired. This has concomitant effect on the quantity of 
maize that enters the markets and marketing systems.
Policy implications from this are first and foremost 
the imperative to improve smallholder maize farmers’ 
access to fertilisers. Though the National Fertiliser 
Quality Control Act has been approved, there should be 
a policy to ensure that smallholder farmers in remotely 
located areas have equitable access. The movement of 
7 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS
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subsidised fertiliser from the public to the private sector 
can sabotage the government's efforts to improve 
smallholder productivity. On average, fertiliser subsidy 
policies tend to have a greater impact on total fertiliser 
use when administered in areas where the private 
sector has been inactive and when policies target small 
scale farming households that cannot pay for fertiliser 
at landing market prices. Therefore, it is recommended 
that the government provide a conducive environment 
for the private sector to play its role in the procurement 
and distribution of agricultural inputs, while the 
government maintains its position in quality control 
and the enforcement of policy implementation. This will 
enhance the commercialisation of the MVC in Nigeria. 
It is also clear that the current levels of informal and 
unregulated cross border trade is a significant barrier to 
the development of the MVC. Nigeria plays a significant 
role in this informal trade with flows of petrol, grain, and 
fertiliser, which penetrate the northern and western 
parts of Niger, being re-exported to Mali, Burkina 
Faso, and Ghana. Such re-allocation and smuggling of 
subsidised fertilisers and other subsidised inputs from 
Nigeria represent a significant constraint to agricultural 
development. The significant volumes of maize and 
inputs traded informally between Niger and Nigeria 
imply the involvement of small and large traders, who 
take indirect advantage of the non-tariff measures 
(like bribes) and roadblocks. Therefore, a clear and 
consistent policy initiative should be implemented to 
better control this cross-border trade.
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ANNEXES
Annex A:  Study questions
The study focused on four topic areas: (1) an overview of the MVC; (2) mapping the value chain; (3) policy making 
concerning the value chain, and (4) social differences within the chain. The research questions are as follows: 
I. An overview of the MVC: 
• Are there any changing patterns in the political importance of the MVC?
• What have been the key drivers of the performance of the MVC?
• What is the current performance of the MVC, with high-level reasons for why it is performing as it is?
II. Mapping the MVC
• What is the final market(s) for maize? 
• What are the major market requirements?
• What are the different stages and processes along the MVC?
• What are the main technical challenges that value chain actors must overcome to ensure 
competitiveness? 
• How many players are involved at each stage of the MVC? Who are they? 
III. Policy making concerning the MVC
• What are the major changes in policies along the MVC?
• What are the major current policies and regulations that govern participation in the MVC? 
• Which of these policies are most contested, by whom and why? 
• Who sets these policies and regulations? 
• Who seeks to influence policy within the MVC, and how? 
• Are there new considerations with relevance to emerging policy agendas and funding on climate-
resilient or climate-smart agriculture?
IV. Social difference within the MVC:
• Which relevant social groups can be identified in the narrative of commercialisation of the MVC? 
What are their interconnections across scales and farm sizes? 
• How is labour organised in the MVC, what are the implications of this for different groups, and how 
does this interact with other labour requirements, including unpaid care?
• Has commercialisation had different outcomes and impacts for different groups?
Annex B: A list of MVC actors that participated in the KIIs
Primary maize producers (farmers):
1. Nuhu Aminu, Chairman, Maize Farmers Association, Zaria, Kaduna State
2. Saleh Saidu, Chairman, Fadama Farmers Association, Zaria, Kaduna State
3. Elijah Ishaku, Head of Operations, Babban Gona Farmers’ Services Limited, Ikara, Kaduna State
Fertiliser input suppliers:
4. Aliyu Ahmed Bakure, Zaria, Kaduna State
Seed producers and suppliers
5. Prof. A. O Ogungbile, Premier Seeds Limited, Zaria, Kaduna State
6. Stephen Atar, Managing Director/CEO, Da All-Green Seeds Limited, Kaduna State, Kaduna State 
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Wholesale maize marketers:
7. Salisu A. Nuhu, Managing Director/CEO, Salisu A. Nuhu and Sons Limited, Zaria, Kaduna State
8. Zubairu Fatika, Zaria, Kaduna State
9. Daguda Tahiru, Giwa Market, Kaduna State
10. Hamisu Yahaya, Chairman, Giwa Grains Marketers, Giwa, Kaduna State
Processing industries:
11. Alao Rotimi, Head of Supply Chain, Hybrid Feeds Limited, Kaduna State
Research institutes:
12. Prof. D. A. Abba, Researcher, Institute of Agricultural Research, ABU, Zaria, Kaduna State
Credit institution:
13. Felix Ehindero, Branch Manager, Bank of Agriculture, Zaria, Kaduna State
Policy:
14. Lucas Garba, Director, Extension, Kaduna State ADP
15. Danjuma Tyuka, Director, Monitoring and Evaluation, Kaduna State ADP
16. Programme Manager, Plateau State ADP
17. David Darina, Director, Finance and Administration, Plateau State, ADP
18. Sati Dagal, Chief Research Officer, Plateau State ADP
Annex C: KII guide
Introduction
The KII is being carried out to determine the roles of different actors along the MVC, vis à vis the interplay of state 
policies in the commercialisation of maize. The lead questions here are not cast on stone. It is just a guide, which 
can be used flexibly to gather more information on the MVC.
The Major actors identified in the MVC are itemised below:
9. Maize farmers’ Associations
10. Fadama maize farmers (Kaduna, Kano)
11. Commercial maize farmers (Babban Gona, Kaduna, Mangu, Saminaka)
12. Fertilizer input suppliers
13. Seed companies (Da All Green – Kaduna, Premier Seeds)
14. Marketers (wholesalers and warehousing)
15. Value addition/processors (Grand Cereals and NASCO) 
16. Research institutes (IITA, Kano, the Institute for Agricultural Research) 
17. Credit Institutions (NIRSAL, Bank of Agriculture, commercial banks)
18. Policy makers (FMARD/ADP)
Maize farmers’ associations/Fadama maize farmers (Kaduna, Kano)
1. How long have you been farming maize?
2. Do you consider maize production profitable?
3. Where do you source your production inputs? (foreign or local markets)
4. Where do you sell your maize grain? (foreign or local markets)
5. Is the Fadama group registered? (If yes, provide name)
6. Are there institutional rules/policies guiding your operations?
7. Who made the rules?
8. Do you have operational guidelines guiding your operations?
9. Does change in regime/government affect your activities and operations? (If yes, what is the nature 
of the effect, when did it specifically happen?)
10. What are the challenges hindering your expansion? (Identify the major challenges to commercialisation 
and their promoters)
11. What should be the possible solutions?
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Commercial maize farmers
1. How long have you been farming maize?
2. What is the name of your farm?
3. Is it formally registered?
4. How many people do you employ?
5. Where do you source your production inputs? (foreign or local markets)
6. Where do you sell your maize grains? (foreign or local markets)
7. Are there institutional rules/policies guiding your operations?
8. Who made the rules?
9. Do you have operational guidelines guiding your operations?
10. Does change in regime/government affect your activities and operations? (If yes, what was the 
nature of the effect, when did it specifically happen?).
11. What are the challenges hindering your expansion? (Quality of maize, climate change, access to 
inputs, state and non-state actors that serve as impediments)
12. What do you think should be the solutions?
Fertiliser input suppliers/seed companies
1. From where do you source your goods/supplies? (foreign or local markets)
2. Do you pay taxes/levies?
3. How much do you pay per consignment?
4. Do you consider the taxes/levies exorbitant?
5. Who are your major buyers?
6. Does change in regime/government affect your activities and operations? (If yes, what was the 
nature of the effect, when did it specifically happen?)
7. What challenges are hindering your business?
8. What do you think should be the solutions?
Marketers
1. Where do you source your supplies?
2. What time of the year do you make your purchases?
3. Where do you sell your maize? (foreign or local markets)
4. Who are your major buyers?
5. Are there barriers to entering the markets? (If yes, identify the barriers and their promoters. Also 
identify their gains)
6. What challenges do you face in selling your maize?
7. What should be the solutions?
 
Value addition/processors
1. What products do you make from maize?
2. Where do you sell your products?
3. Is your firm formally registered?
4. Are there barriers to being a processor? (If yes, identify the barriers and their promoters. Also 
identify their gains)
5. From where do you source your maize grain? (foreign or local markets)
6. What challenges do you have in purchasing your raw materials (maize grain)?
7. Do you have enough storage facilities for your raw materials (maize grain)?
8. From where do you source your machineries? (foreign or local markets)
9. What challenges do you face in sourcing your machineries?
10. What type of power drives the machineries in your firm? (Provide number of hours if national grid is 
used and number of hours if diesel is used).
11. Do you enjoy any incentives from the government?
12. How many people are in your employment?
13. Has the patronage for your products increased or declined in relation to the income status of 
Nigerians?
14. Does change in regime/government affect your activities and operations (If yes, what was the 
nature of the effect, when did it specifically happen?)
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15. What challenges do you have in selling your products?
16. What should be the solutions to the challenges?
Federal Ministry of Agriculture (FMARD)/State ADPs
1. Is maize among the targeted crops in the State?
2. What specific policies/incentives are put in place to promote its production across the value chain? 
(Tax relief, any form of moratorium etc.)
3. Who benefits from the policies? (Maize farmers, processors or are they hijacked by State actors)
4. When did the policy/incentive become operational in the State?
5. What challenges are hindering maize production and development of the value chain in the State?
6. What should be the solutions to the challenges?
Research institutes
1. How long have you been involved in maize research?
2. What advances did you make from the research? 
3. Is the result of the research accepted and used by farmers?
4. What do you think are the hindrances to the commercialisation of maize in the country?
5. What do you think are the major challenges to self-sufficiency in maize production in the country?
6. Does change in regime/government affect your activities and operations (If yes, what was the 
nature of the effect, when did it specifically happen?)
7. What general challenges do you face that hinder MVC development?
8. What should be the solutions?
Credit institutions
1. Do you have schemes targeted at developing maize and the MVC? (If yes, what are they?) 
2. Do the policies target small or commercial farmers? Are they gender sensitive?
3. What is the extent of patronage of maize famers and value chain actors to boost their operations?
4. Is maize production on the increase or on the decrease?
5. Who patronises you most? (Farmers, politicians etc.)
6. Has maize price affected your patronage over the years?
7. How do you rate your contribution to maize: production, marketing, and processing?
8. What challenges do you face in boosting the MVC?
9. What should be the solutions?
Policy makers
1. Are there policies governing maize and its value chain operations? (If yes, what are they?) 
2. Are the policies targeted at small scale or commercial farmers?
3. Who initiated the policies? (Federal government, State governments, NGOs, farmer groups etc.)
4. When was the policy formulated and implemented?
5. Do you consider the policy to be effective? (If yes, mention specific achievements)
6. How can you rate the impact of the policies on the MVC?
7. Does the policy come with any incentives in support of the MVC? (Do the MVC actors take 
advantage of the incentives or is it being hijacked by non-actors?)
8. What are the challenges to the implementation of the policies?
9. What are the challenges to the commercialisation of maize and its value chain in the country?
10. What should be the solutions to the challenges?
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